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MASS SOLITARY AND MASS INCARCERATION:
EXPLAINING THE DRAMATIC RISE IN
PROLONGED SOLITARY IN AMERICA’S
PRISONS
Jules Lobel
ABSTRACT—In the last two decades of the twentieth century, prisons
throughout the United States witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of solitary
confinement, and the practice continues to be widespread. From the latter
part of the nineteenth century until the 1970s and ’80s, prolonged solitary
confinement in the United States had fallen into disuse, as numerous
observers and the United States Supreme Court recognized that the practice
caused profound mental harm to prisoners. The reasons for this dramatic rise
in the nationwide use of solitary confinement and the development of new
supermax prisons have not been explored in depth. In particular, there has
been little critical discussion of the rise of mass prolonged solitary as a
product of the mass incarceration of the last several decades of the twentieth
century.
This Essay locates the rise of mass solitary in the 1980s in the context
of mass incarceration. It explains the dramatic expansion of the use of
solitary confinement and the construction of new super-maximum
(supermax) prisons as an attempt by prison officials and politicians to
maintain control of prisons in the face of increasingly radicalized, rebellious
prisoners—often, but not exclusively, African-American—who had
organized protests and disobedient conduct in American prisons from the
1960s to the 1980s. The rise of solitary was connected to the use of mass
incarceration as a form of social control. As society became more violent, so
too did many prisons, but to view that violence as the underlying cause of
the growth of supermax and other segregated confinement obscures the
deeper, underlying causes of the rise of mass solitary. Those causes are
linked to the rise of mass incarceration itself. Uncovering the history and
causes of the dramatic rise in supermax prisons and the use of prolonged
solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s is critical to understanding not
only how we got to where we are, but how we can end this cruel and
inhumane practice.
The first Part of this Essay recounts the origins of the supermax prison
at Marion Federal Penitentiary in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
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demonstrates that the rise of mass solitary was more an official reaction to
the need to control politically active and disruptive prisoners than to the
violence narrative. The second Part explores prison officials’ need to reassert
control over their prisoners and draws the parallels between the rise of both
mass incarceration and mass solitary as a racialized mechanism of social
control. The third Part introduces the preventive paradigm as a model to
control prisoners and demonstrates that the concept of preventing future
misconduct fueled both mass incarceration and the modern supermax,
resulting in minimizing due process restraints and erroneously isolating
thousands of people. Finally, the last Part analyzes the current reform
movement and the alternatives that have been proffered and utilized to
replace solitary, supermax confinement. The Essay concludes that prolonged
solitary confinement can be abolished, and that prison officials have
alternatives that can safely manage even very dangerous prisoners.
AUTHOR—Bessie McKee Walthour Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh Law School. I want to thank my research assistants Emma Carson
and Ariel Fleischer for their invaluable research, and Professor Todd May
and Staughton and Alice Lynd for their insightful comments and advice. I
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School for the financial support and encouragement for my research and the
staff of the University of Pittsburgh Document Technology Center for their
assistance in preparing this manuscript.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, prisons throughout the
United States witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of solitary confinement,
and the practice continues to be widespread. From the latter part of the
160
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nineteenth century until the 1970s and ’80s, prolonged solitary confinement
in the United States fell into disuse, as numerous observers recognized that
the practice caused profound mental harm to prisoners. 1 In 1890, the United
States Supreme Court summarized the mental harm caused by solitary
confinement, noting that “[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell . . .
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse
them, and others became violently insane, others, still, committed suicide”
and even “those who stood the ordeal better . . . in most cases did not recover
sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.” 2
The era of large-scale isolation practiced in the early nineteenth century
thus came to an end in the beginning of the twentieth century.3 Isolation was
still used in American prisons, but typically as short-term punishment and
on a much smaller scale. 4 Even the harshest prison in the federal system, the
infamous and widely criticized Alcatraz—which made no pretense of
rehabilitation, employed no teachers, social workers, or psychologists, and
severely limited contact with the outside world—nonetheless provided
congregate work and recreational activities for most prisoners. 5 While many
1

Charles Dickens visited the Cherry Hill, Pennsylvania prison in 1842 and reported:

I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and agony
which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers . . . there is a depth
of terrible endurance in it which none but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man
has a right to inflict upon his fellow-creature. I hold this slow and daily tampering with the
mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body . . . .
CHARLES DICKENS , AMERICAN N OTES 39 (New York, Harper & Bros. 1842).
Danish fairy tale author Hans Christian Andersen reported that a similar Pennsylvania-model prison
in Sweden, which used solitary confinement, was “a well-built machine—a nightmare for the spirit.”
HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, PICTURES OF SWEDEN 56 (London, Richard Bentley 1851). And the wellknown sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville and his colleague Gustav de Beaumont observed that a similar
form of solitary confinement tried in Auburn, New York “proved fatal for the majority of the prisoners.
It devours the victim incessantly and unmercifully; it does not reform, it kills. The unfortunate creatures
submitted to this experiment wasted away . . . .” TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS: AN H ISTORICAL
SURVEY OF PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS 49, 260 nn.9 & 10 (1976) (quoting
GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DU SYSTÈME PÉNITENTIAIRE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ,
ET DE SON APPLICATION EN FRANCE 13–14 (Paris, Fournier 1833)). For an alternate English translation,
see G USTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 41 (Francis Lieber trans., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964)
(1833).
2
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
3
Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and
Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 467 (2006).
4
Id.
5
See David A. Ward & Thomas G. Werlich, Alcatraz and Marion: Evaluating Super-Maximum
Custody, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 53, 55–56 (2003); see also Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of
Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’ Y 163, 166 (1999)
(explaining that while Alcatraz was a strict institution intended to “break spirits,” the notoriously
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state correctional systems designated certain prisons for the most violent
prisoners, rarely did those prisons “operate[] on a total lockdown basis as
normal routine.”6 Instead, prisons designated as maximum security
“generally allowed movement, inmate interaction, congregate programs, and
work opportunities.”7
However, starting in 1972 with the creation of the control unit at the
new United States Penitentiary at Marion, and escalating with Marion’s total
lockdown and the construction of fifty-seven new super-maximum
(supermax) prisons in the 1980s and 1990s,8 the model of incarcerating large
numbers of prisoners in near total isolation from each other and the outside
world proliferated. By the end of 1998, approximately 20,000 prisoners, or
close to 2% of all prisoners serving a year or more in American prisons, were
incarcerated in supermax prisons.9 In these supermax facilities, all prisoners
were isolated in their cells twenty-three hours per day, with virtually no
contact with other prisoners or staff, no programming, no congregate
recreation, and no contact visits with family or friends. 10 Moreover, the use
of solitary units throughout the nation’s prisons dramatically expanded, with
prison officials using a myriad of terms such as restrictive housing,
disciplinary segregation, administrative segregation, and security housing
units to denote the practice of solitary confinement. 11 In 2000, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics reported that approximately 80,000 people were confined
in state or federal segregation units, and the data indicated that between 1995
and 2000, “the growth rate in the number of prisoners housed in segregation

draconian prison lacked many of the features of the modern supermax as prisoners were able to
communicate between cells and permitted to recreate and work together).
6
CHASE RIVELAND, SUPERMAX PRISONS : OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999)
(explaining the rise of the supermax prison in a report for the Department of Justice).
7
Id.
8
See King, supra note 5, at 167; Daniel P. Mears & Jamie Watson, Towards a Fair and Balanced
Assessment of Supermax Prisons, 23 JUST. Q. 232, 232–33 (2006) (noting that as of 2006, there were at
least fifty-seven supermax prisons in forty states that housed approximately 20,000 prisoners).
9
King, supra note 5, at 164.
10
Id. at 172; Mears & Watson, supra note 8, at 232, 234, 241.
11
Solitary confinement in the United States has been utilized to discipline prisoners for their
misconduct while in prison, as an administrative measure to allegedly prevent future violence by
prisoners, and in some cases, such as in certain state death rows, to segregate prisoners because of the
crimes they have committed. In other countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, solitary confinement
is also used in pretrial detention. See ACLU, A DEATH BEFORE DYING: SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ON
DEATH ROW 2, 4 (2013); Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith, Solitary Confinement—From Extreme
Isolation to Prison Reform, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD
REFORM 1, 3–4 (Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith eds., 2020) [hereinafter SOLITARY C ONFINEMENT].

162

115:159 (2020)

Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration

far outpaced the growth rate of the overall prison population.” 12 In 2014, a
report by the Yale Law School Liman Center and the Association of State
Correctional Administrators estimated that, as of 2014, approximately
80,000 to 100,000 prisoners in state and federal prisons were in some form
of restricted housing, defined as twenty-two to twenty-three hours per day
isolated in their cells.13
The reasons for this dramatic rise in the nationwide use of solitary
confinement and the development of new supermax prisons have not been
explored in depth. In particular, there has been little critical discussion of the
rise of mass prolonged solitary as a product of the mass incarceration of the
last several decades of the twentieth century. 14
The standard, simple explanation for the rebirth of mass solitary in
American prisons is that it resulted from the significant rise in prison
violence fueled in large part by the emergence of prison gangs, which
seemed to leave prison officials with no alternative but to isolate the most
dangerous, predatory prisoners.15 From this mainstream perspective, the rise
of the supermax is tied to the same forces that brought about mass
incarceration in that both the explosion of the prison population and the
proliferation of supermax prisons were reactions to the rise in societal

12
COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN AM .’S PRISONS, VERA INST. OF J USTICE, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT
53
(2006),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/confrontingconfinement/legacy_downloads/Confronting_Confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BZT -8M7F]; see also
Kevin Johnson, Commission Warns of Harm Isolation Can Do to Prisoners, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006,
at 14A (reporting on the Commission’s findings).
13
THE LIMAN PROGRAM , YALE LAW SCH. & ASS’ N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, TIME-IN-CELL: THE
ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON, at i, ii, 14–26
(2015)
[hereinafter
TIME -IN-CELL],
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-cell_combined_web_august_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/45BN-TEAX]; see also ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF J USTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 249209, SPECIAL REPORT: USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS AND JAILS,
2011–12, at 1 (2015) (estimating that “[o]n an average day in 2011–12, up to 4.4% of state and federal
inmates and 2.7% of jail inmates were held in administrative segregation or solitary confinement”).
14
Two notable exceptions to the lack of critical academic scholarship exploring the reasons behind
the rise of prolonged solitary confinement are Professors Keramet Reiter and Marie Gottschalk. See
KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
(2016) [hereinafter REITER, 23/7] (exploring the reasons behind the rise of the Pelican Bay Prison Security
Housing Unit); Keramet Reiter, The Rise of Supermax Imprisonment in the United States, in SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 77, 77 (reviewing the origins of supermax prisons in Arizona and
California and the role of litigation in shaping such institutions); Marie Gottschalk, Staying Alive:
Reforming Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 125 YALE L.J.F. 253 (2016) (discussing the
historic proliferation of solitary confinement and its current use).
15
See, e.g., King, supra note 5, at 176 (reporting on a survey of prison administrators that claimed
that managing violent prisoners, particularly gang members, was the reason for the development of
supermax housing).
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violence. As Congressman Robert Kastenmeier argued in opening the 1985
congressional hearings on the continued lockdown of prisoners in Marion,
“[P]rison situations often mirror what is happening in society at-large.”16 The
increase in violence in prison settings “is not dissimilar” to the violence
taking place in society.17 So too, Norman Carlson, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the 1970s and ’80s, testified before Congress
that “[p]risons are microcosms of the larger society,” and that it is necessary
to “isolate” those who resort to “violence, threats, and intimidation” from
society.18
However, recent critical scholarship has critiqued the mainstream
perspective that the rise of mass incarceration in the last quarter of the
twentieth century was simply a reaction to increasing crime and violence in
American streets. Michelle Alexander, a leading critic of the mainstream
narrative, has argued that “mass incarceration in the United States . . .
emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of
racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim
Crow.”19 Other critiques have also rejected the standard assertion that mass
incarceration was simply a response to increased violence by pointing out
the nature of the criminal justice system as a mechanism of social control
and articulating other causes for the rise of mass imprisonment. 20 While some
of these writers do not ignore the clear fact that crime rates substantially rose
in the latter part of the twentieth century, 21 they explain the rise of mass
incarceration as a reaction instead to the rise of the civil rights movement
and the societal disruption and tumult of the 1960s and ’70s.22 So too, the
16
Marion Penitentiary—1985: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
& the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing] (opening statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 149 (statement of Norman Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons).
19
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010).
20
See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND H OW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (explaining that prison growth has been driven primarily by increased
felony-filing by prosecutors); Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race
Question’ in the U.S., 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41 (2002) (identifying the trajectory of racial domination in the
United States and the need to bolster an eroding caste cleavage as the main impetus behind expansion of
America’s penal system).
21
See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 41; James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 35 & nn.41 & 42 (2012) (pointing out
that many scholars completely ignore the increasing violence, while some do mention it).
22
See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT I MPERATIVE: THE RISE
AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014) (concluding that the relentless punitive spirit
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rise of mass solitary cannot simply be explained by an increase of violence
in society or prisons.
This Essay locates the rise of mass solitary in the 1980s in the context
of mass incarceration. It explains the dramatic expansion of the use of
solitary confinement and the construction of new supermax prisons as an
attempt by prison officials and politicians to maintain control of prisons in
the face of increasingly radicalized, rebellious prisoners—often, but not
exclusively, African Americans—who had organized protests and
disobedient conduct in American prisons from the 1960s to the 1980s. As
Professor Judith Resnik has persuasively argued, solitary confinement
cannot be viewed in isolation from the panoply of harsh prison policies that
characterize modern prison management.23 This Essay expands that
perspective to analyze how the rise of solitary was connected to the use of
mass incarceration as a form of social control. As society became more
violent, so too did many prisons, but to view that violence as the underlying
cause of the growth of supermax and other segregated confinement obscures
the deeper, underlying causes of the rise of mass solitary. Those causes are
linked to the rise of mass incarceration itself.
As an initial matter, prison officials responded to the growing political
activism of the 1960s and ’70s, often led by radical African-American
activists, by developing a mass, often racialized system of control in prisons.
This trend in prisons ran parallel to the political use of mass imprisonment
as a form of social control in reaction to the political movements and
disturbances of that era.24 Second, one aspect of the prison population’s
tremendous growth is the criminal justice system’s shift to a preventive
ascendant in the United States from the 1960s to the early 2000s operated as the rationale for mass
incarceration and, together with the co-alignment of an array of forces, gave rise to a type of social
experiment in expanded social control coined “The Punishment Imperative”); ALEXES HARRIS , A POUND
OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016) (analyzing the criminal justice
system as a method of social control for managing, punishing, and marginalizing a subset of the U.S.
population because of their poverty status); PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS
INCARCERATION (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007) (identifying numerous esoteric private and
public industries and companies whose financial motivations coalesced to help cultivate and sustain mass
imprisonment); Forman, Jr., supra note 21 (discussing the history of the New Jim Crow thesis and the
author’s common ground and differences with the thesis).
23
Judith Resnik, Not Isolating Isolation, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 89, 89
(“Solitary confinement is discretely troubling but reflective of the structure of U.S. prisons, which are
organized to isolate people in a myriad of ways.”).
24
See, e.g., REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 52–58 (discussing the powerful legacy of George Jackson
in creating a “genuine fear” among California prison officials “that they were losing control of the
prisons”); Resnik, supra note 23, at 90 (“[G]overnment officials used their fears of prisoners’ activism to
impose hyper-confinement on hundreds of individuals; targeted were many individuals of the Muslim
faith who understood their struggle to be part of an international human rights movement.”).
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model—in other words, a shift from punishing people for crimes they
committed to punishing dangerousness, namely, locking people up for long
periods of time to incapacitate them from committing crimes in the future
and to deter others from committing offenses. 25 Similarly, the rise of the
supermax and prolonged solitary confinement was in part premised on a shift
in the rationale for solitary—from a short-term, discrete punishment for
alleged prisoner misbehavior in prison to lengthy, often indeterminate
incapacitation and isolation of prisoners who were perceived to be dangerous
as a preventive measure. 26 Third, mass incarceration accelerated the
overcrowding of many state prison systems, often resulting in worsening
prison conditions and a subsequent rise of turmoil and violence in prisons. 27
These disturbances were then used as a justification for the creation of
supermax prisons.28 Fourth, the same law-and-order political ideology based
on punitiveness and symbolic toughness led to initiatives from politicians,
rather than correctional officials, who sought political gain.29
Uncovering the history and causes of the dramatic rise in supermax
prisons and the use of prolonged solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s
is critical to understanding not only how we got to where we are, but how
we can end this cruel and inhumane practice. 30 The rationale that prolonged
25
Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 & n.1 (2001).
26
See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent
Emergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 389 (2003).
27
See COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ASS’ N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., SUPERMAX
CONFINEMENT IN U.S. PRISONS 9 (2011) (“Supermax confinement became one method to address the
problems resulting from this rapid increase in prison population.”); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch,
Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement,
23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC . CHANGE 477, 491 (1997) (“[R]apid expansion of the nation’s prison
population . . . has meant that most correctional systems are plagued by extreme overcrowding and the
serious management and control problems that go with it. Many prison officials appear convinced that
the turmoil brought about by increased population pressures can be managed by segregating and isolating
prisoners whom they view as especially troublesome.”); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 500–02
(2011) (discussing problems associated with overcrowding).
28
See generally Keramet Reiter, The Path to Pelican Bay: The Origins of the Supermax Prison in
the Shadow of the Law, 1982–1989, in CAGING BORDERS AND CARCERAL STATES 303, 303–32 (Robert
T. Chase ed., 2019) (examining the development of the supermax prison in California in response to
prison violence and the call to address the conditions caused by overcrowding); see also Austin v.
Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722–25 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (describing the origins of Ohio supermax
sparked by a 1993 riot in Ohio’s maximum-security prison, which did not have sufficient cells to house
maximum-security prisoners).
29
RIVELAND, supra note 6, at 5; Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and
Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 390–91 (2001).
30
See generally Sadie Dingfelder, Psychologist Testifies on the Risks of Solitary Confinement, AM .
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, Oct. 2012, at 10 (reporting on Dr. Craig Haney’s testimony on solitary confinement’s
“grave risk of psychological harm”); Haney & Lynch, supra note 27 (examining the history of solitary

166

115:159 (2020)

Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration

solitary as the only way to manage very violent prisoners underlies both
society’s and courts’ disposition to allow what seems obviously harmful 31—
confining a person in a small cell; twenty-three hours per day for years;
without any programming or physical contact with spouses, families, or
friends; and with little exercise except in small individual cages or rooms.
While the past decade has witnessed some reform of mass incarceration and
increasing public, judicial, and correctional-official concern that solitary
confinement has been overused and should be limited or ended, 32 this reform
spirit often does not address the problem of the seriously violent prisoner.
Some critics of mass incarceration have recognized that we will never end
mass incarceration until we face the problem of violence openly and
honestly. 33 So too, opponents of solitary confinement who have focused on
advocating for particularly vulnerable populations 34 or prisoners who present
no serious security threat must confront the problem of what to do with the
very violent prisoner.
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Porter v. Clarke illustrates this
problem. 35 Reflecting the scientific consensus, the Fourth Circuit found that
the placement of prisoners on Virginia’s death row in prolonged solitary
confinement created a “‘substantial risk’ of serious psychological and
emotional harm,” and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. 36

confinement and its case law in the United States to argue for its regulation); Smith, supra note 3
(reviewing the history and literature on solitary confinement and the development of the supermax prison
to demonstrate the substantial effects of long-term isolation); Kirsten Weir, Alone, in ‘The Hole,’ AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’ N, May 2012, at 54 (reporting on the psychological effects of long-term solitary
confinement).
31
As Judge Richard Posner put it, confinement in the “segregation unit involves considerable
isolation, sometimes for protracted periods; and the record shows, what anyway seems pretty obvious,
that isolating a human being from other human beings year after year or even month after month can
cause substantial psychological damage.” Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1988).
32
See TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 13, at 3, 4; Lobel & Smith, supra note 11, at 1.
33
DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO
REPAIR (2019); Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Reckoning with Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/opinion/violence-criminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/9C3F3RL8].
34
Particularly vulnerable populations include groups such as prisoners housed in solitary who are
mentally ill, juveniles, and pregnant women. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (holding that seriously mentally ill prisoners could not be held in isolation in the Pelican Bay
Security Housing Unit); Anne Teigen & Sarah Brown, Rethinking Solitary Confinement for Juveniles,
24 NCSL, no. 20, 2016, available at https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/rethinkingsolitary-confinement-for-juveniles.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Z7T-BZHT] (reporting that as of that date,
“[n]ine states recently passed laws to limit or prohibit using solitary confinement for juvenile offenders”).
35
923 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the imposition of prolonged solitary confinement
violates the Eighth Amendment).
36
Id. at 361, 364.
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Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in
disregarding the State’s argument that legitimate penological considerations
justified the challenged conditions on death row. The court explained that
had officials presented such legitimate reasons, which in Porter they did not,
similar conditions of solitary could be upheld. 37 For the Fourth Circuit,
“prison officials tasked with the difficult task of operating a detention center
may reasonably determine that prolonged solitary detention of the inmate is
necessary to protect the well-being of prison employees, inmates, and the
public or to serve some other legitimate penological objective.” 38 Some
courts have noted that the role “legitimate penological interests” plays in
Eighth Amendment litigation has been confusing. 39 Where prison officials
knowingly deprive a prisoner of basic human needs, such as the need for
human contact, no invocation of “legitimate penological reasons” should
justify such a practice. 40 Nonetheless, Justice Anthony Kennedy undoubtedly
expressed a sentiment shared by other judges when he claimed that the issue
in a judicial challenge to solitary confinement will be “whether workable
alternative systems for long-term confinement exist.”41
Uncovering the history of the rise of the supermax and debunking the
myth that the supermax was simply a reaction to a rise of prisoner violence
also demonstrate that at critical junctures, alternatives to the supermax did,
in fact, exist. Nonetheless, the state and federal governments elected to
ignore those alternatives. The recognition that alternatives to prolonged
solitary confinement do exist, as states such as Colorado and North Dakota
have now concluded, 42 provides hope that this inhumane practice can and
will be ended.
The first Part of this Essay recounts the origins of the supermax prison
at Marion Federal Penitentiary in the late 1970s and early 1980s and

37

Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 363. In a footnote, the court noted that the dissent’s view that the “opinion could ‘interfer[e]’
with prison officials’ ability to safely confine inmates housed at ‘the federal supermax prisons in Colorado
and Illinois’ is without merit” because the majority’s decision permitted correctional officials to argue
that the penological interest in protecting against violence would outweigh the serious harm to the
prisoners of placing them in solitary confinement. Id. at 363 n.2.
39
Id. at 362 (“Notwithstanding the uncertain role of penological justification in conditions of
confinement cases . . . .”); Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The precise
role of legitimate penological interests is not entirely clear in the context of an Eighth Amendment
challenge to conditions of confinement.”).
40
Jules Lobel, The Liman Report and Alternatives to Prolonged Solitary Confinement, 125 YALE
L.J.F. 238, 240–43 (2016).
41
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42
See Rick Raemisch, Colorado Ends Prolonged, Indeterminate Solitary Confinement, in SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 311, 311–313; Leann K. Bertsch, Reflections on North Dakota’s
Sustained Solitary Confinement Reform, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 325, 325.
38
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demonstrates that the rise of mass solitary was more an official reaction to
the need to control politically active and disruptive prisoners than to the
violence narrative. The second Part explores prison officials’ need to reassert
control over their prisoners and draws the parallels between the rise of both
mass incarceration and mass solitary as a racialized mechanism of social
control. The third Part introduces the preventive paradigm as a model to
control prisoners and demonstrates that the concept of preventing future
misconduct fueled both mass incarceration and the modern supermax,
resulting in minimizing due process restraints and erroneously isolating
thousands of people. Finally, the last Part analyzes the current reform
movement and the alternatives that have been proffered and utilized to
replace solitary, supermax confinement. The Essay concludes that prolonged
solitary confinement can be abolished, and that prison officials have
alternatives that can safely manage even very dangerous prisoners.
I.

THE VIOLENCE NARRATIVE AND THE RISE OF THE SUPERMAX
A. The Violence Narrative

The standard explanation for the rise of the supermax and prolonged
solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s is that a significant rise in
violence in American prisons, particularly fueled by the emergence of
violent prison gangs, left prison officials with no alternative but to create
supermax prisons that placed the most dangerous, predatory prisoners in
high-security isolation. A survey conducted by the National Institute of
Corrections in 1997 reported that all but one of the jurisdictions that replied
claimed that the development of supermax housing was largely a response
to the need for better methods of managing “violent and seriously disruptive
inmates.”43 For many of these state administrators, the root of the violence
came from the activities of gang members. 44 As Human Rights Watch noted
in its generally critical 1997 report on the Indiana supermax,
The rationale behind supermax facilities and units is rather simple: in an era of
rampant violence in many prisons, the segregation of dangerous inmates allows
inmates in other facilities to serve their time with less fear of assault; the
extreme limitations on inmates’ freedom in such facilities protects both staff

43

NAT’L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX HOUSING: A SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 3 (1997)
[hereinafter SUPERMAX HOUSING].
44
Id.
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and inmates; and the harshness of supermax conditions is believed to deter other
prisoners from committing acts that might result in their transfer there.45

So too, the then-Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Norman
Carlson, testified before Congress that the institution of a prison-wide
lockdown at Marion in the 1980s was “the only answer we have at present”
for preventing violence by a small number of individuals in prison, and that
the lockdown had successfully reduced violence throughout the federal
system. 46
The Seventh Circuit’s unanimous decision in Bruscino v. Carlson47 is
typical of judicial decisions in the 1980s and ’90s dealing with the rise of
mass solitary.48 The court in Bruscino rejected the Marion prisoners’ claims
that prolonged isolation resulting from the permanent lockdown violated the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.49 Judge
Richard Posner, writing for the court, recognized that conditions involved in
the Marion lockdown were “depressing in the extreme,” and for prisoners
“[t]o live under such conditions [was] sordid and horrible.” 50 Nonetheless,
the court held that while the “conditions in Marion deserve careful
scrutiny . . . they must be evaluated against the background of an
extraordinary history of inmate violence” and that “[t]he defendants placed
in the record a remarkable narrative of the violence that led up to the
lockdown.”51 After recounting in detail the violence at Marion preceding the
lockdown, which included the murder of two guards and a number of
inmates, the court noted that “[i]f order could be maintained in Marion
without resort to the harsh methods attacked in this lawsuit, the plaintiffs

45
JAMIE FELLNER & J OANNE MARINER, H UMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER MAXIMUM
SECURITY
CONFINEMENT
IN
INDIANA
(1997),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/usind/ [https://perma.cc/5MK2-XSMX].
46
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 142–43 (statement of Norman Carlson, Director, Federal
Bureau of Prisons).
47
854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988).
48
See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that lockdown did not
violate Eighth Amendment because it was necessary to contain violence); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.
1146, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that indeterminate solitary confinement in Pelican Bay SHU does
not violate Eighth Amendment for those prisoners who are not seriously mentally ill).
49
854 F.2d at 166.
50
Id. at 164, 166. The magistrate judge and district court also rejected as not credible the testimony
of numerous prisoners who testified to beatings and other mistreatment and brutality by correctional
officials during the lockdown. Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 613–14 (S.D. Ill. 1987). The court
of appeals affirmed this part of the ruling, noting that evidence of the beatings consisted of testimony by
inmates “who frequently lie in prisoner rights’ cases,” and that the court was unwilling in any event to
disturb the findings of the magistrate and district court judges. Bruscino, 854 F.2d at 166–67.
51
Id. at 164–65.
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would have a stronger argument that the methods were indeed cruel and
unusual punishments.”52
While the court’s suggestion—whether a prison condition (or set of
conditions) constitutes torture versus a permissible reaction to prison
violence is dependent on whether there are any alternatives—seems wrong
as a matter of law, as a practical matter the potential alternatives to the state’s
cruel policies loom large in a judge’s decision on an Eighth Amendment
claim. 53 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Wilkinson v. Austin held that the
process due to prisoners prior to placement in the Ohio supermax had to be
measured against “[p]rison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison
gangs,” which “provides the backdrop of the State’s interest.”54 For Justice
Kennedy and the unanimous Court, the brutality of gangs and their
uncontrollability by normal means meant that “[p]rolonged confinement in
[s]upermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some inmates.” 55
The history of the development of control units and supermaxes,
however, demonstrates that the impetus for the establishment of these units
was often not uncontrollable violence amongst gang members or
pathological murderers in prisons. Rather, the crackdown occurred as a
response to political activism amongst prisoners who disturbed the normal
routine of the prison and threatened the control of prison officials. Even
where political activism was accompanied by violence or hostage-taking,
prisoner actions were often provoked by ignored grievances and demands to
reform prison conditions or end racial discrimination. 56 Moreover, prison
officials themselves often perpetrated the bulk of the violence as retribution
for the prisoners’ activities. 57
52

Id. at 165.
See Lobel, supra note 40, at 239–40 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s focus on workable alternatives
and cases in which courts have affirmed long-term solitary confinement for prisoners deemed particularly
violent).
54
545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005).
55
Id. at 229.
56
See generally STAUGHTON LYND, LUCASVILLE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF A PRISON UPRISING (2d
ed. 2011) (providing a history of the Ohio Lucasville prison riot as a response to the increasing repression
and discrimination by prison officials and their failure to respond to prisoner grievances); HEATHER ANN
THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING OF 1971 AND ITS LEGACY (2016)
(discussing the violent events at Attica in response to the repression and racial discrimination at the prison
which were ignored by prison officials despite prisoner grievances and attempts to address the issues
peacefully).
57
See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 56 (reviewing the events of Attica in 1971 and its aftermath and
demonstrating the disproportionate and unnecessary violence perpetrated by prison officials in ending the
prison uprising); see also Tom Puleo, Guards’ Beatings of Inmates After Riots Happens in Many Prisons,
HARTFORD COURANT (June 27, 1993), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-1993-06-270000100193-story.html [https://perma.cc/6GGA-BKVP].
53

171

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B. Marion and the Creation of the Modern Supermax
The creation of the control unit and the institution of the permanent
lockdown at Marion are often thought of as the precursor and inspiration of
the modern supermax, as state prison officials copied what was then called
the “Marion Model.”58 The story of the Marion control unit’s development
is illustrative of the supermax as a response mainly to disruptive and
rebellious prisoners, not necessarily the most violent.
Marion opened in 1963 and was designed to hold 525 “adult male felons
who are difficult to manage and control.” 59 Marion’s control unit, featuring
prolonged solitary confinement, was created in 1972, but not in response to
escalating prisoner violence. 60 Rather, the first group of prisoners placed in
solitary confinement at the control unit were prisoners engaged in a
nonviolent work stoppage to protest a guard’s beating of a Mexican
prisoner.61 In response to the work stoppage, prison officials created what
was at that time termed the control unit, and later designated the “Long-Term
Control Unit,” thus coining the term “control unit.” 62
The Unit’s origins lay in a behavioral modification program, termed the
Control and Rehabilitation Effort (CARE), begun at Marion in 1968 and used
on prisoners in solitary confinement. 63 The program’s purpose was to bring
prisoners under staff control, not only physically but psychologically, and it
was a key component in the establishment of the control unit in 1972.64

58
Ward & Werlich, supra note 5, at 59 (“[Bruscino v. Carlson] gave legitimacy to what came to be
called the ‘Marion Model’. When state prison wardens visited and observed the unprecedented degree of
control the Marion staff had over prisoners, several commented that they ‘had died and gone to heaven.’”).
59
American Prisons in Turmoil (Part 1): Hearings Before the H.R. Select Comm. on Crime, 92d
Cong. 277 (1972) (statement of George Pickett, Superintendent, Federal Prison, Marion, Ill.); JESSICA
MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS 181 (1973).
60
COMM. TO END THE MARION LOCKDOWN, FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE: CONTROL
UNIT
PRISONS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
2
(1992),
https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC3_scans/3.alcatraz.marion.florence.1992.htm
l [https://perma.cc/SV2W-FR44] [hereinafter FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE]; Bonnie
Kerness & Jamie Bissonette Lewey, Race and the Politics of Isolation in U.S. Prisons, 22 ATLANTIC J.
COMM. 21, 28 (2014).
61
FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 2.
62
Id.
63
Id. The control unit received its first inmates “with a mission which called for a programme of
behaviour modification ‘designed to assist the individual in changing his attitude and behavior.’” King,
supra note 5, at 167.
64
See MITFORD, supra note 59, at 134–35; FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note
60, at 2–3.
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As recounted by the Seventh Circuit in a class action lawsuit, the facts
of the work stoppage and resulting establishment of the control unit were as
follows:
Appellants were segregated after a general work stoppage on July 17, 1972. The
disruption was in violation of prison rules requiring labor of all able-bodied
inmates. To thwart the stoppage, Marion officials first confined the entire prison
population to their cells. Most inmates were released six days later, on July 24,
after seven inmates suspected to be prominent instigators of the mutiny were
relegated to segregation, along with ten supporters insistent upon
accompanying them. Work apparently resumed as normal for only a short time
thereafter. On the afternoon of July 25, a disturbance again put a halt to regular
prison activity. Taking no chances with simply isolating the ringleaders, the
Marion administration undertook widespread segregation of inmates suspected
of insubordination; approximately eighty-six more prisoners were removed
from the general population.65

As the district court found, “In all approximately 103 men were placed in
segregation as a result of their participation in the work stoppages.” 66
District court Judge James Foreman denied plaintiffs’ motion for
injunctive relief, finding that the prison officials had not violated plaintiffs’
due process or Eighth Amendment rights because they had been forced to
deal with an “unusual situation” of a major disruption of prison life, and
“[p]rompt and effective action . . . was required to restore the prison to
normalcy.”67 The court of appeals reversed, finding that these prisoners had
been found guilty of disciplinary rule infractions without being accorded due
process, and remanded to the district court to determine whether their
punishment of long-term, indefinite detention in the control unit was
disproportionate and thus violative of the Eighth Amendment. 68 As the court
of appeals noted, “For a single such event [of misconduct], segregation does
not and should not exceed a few months, if that long.” 69
On remand, the district court addressed the Eighth Amendment claims
of thirty-six prisoners still in the control unit after being accorded hearings
which complied with due process requirements, and determined that the
defendants had not introduced any evidence that any of these prisoners had
committed a serious infraction aside from participating in the 1972 prison

65
66
67
68
69

Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 621–22 (7th Cir. 1973).
Adams v. Carlson, 352 F. Supp. 882, 886–87 (E.D. Ill. 1973).
Id. at 885–86.
Adams, 488 F.2d at 629, 636.
Id. at 628.
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work stoppage.70 The court held that “punishing the Plaintiffs by placing
them in confinement under the very restrictive conditions imposed . . . for a
period of sixteen months constitutes punishment disproportionate to the
various offenses with which these Plaintiffs have been charged and,
consequently, is violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”71 The court ordered their release from the
control unit to General Population. 72 The use of the Eighth Amendment
disproportionality analysis to challenge prisoners’ prolonged solitary
confinement was unprecedented and had the potential to significantly limit
prison officials’ use of such confinement.73
Thus, in repudiating the prison officials’ rationale, the courts
recognized that one of the first large-scale long-term control units was not
designed to hold violent prisoners, but rather those prisoners who disrupted
prison’s normal routine, even where they did so in a nonviolent manner. 74
Regaining control of the prison from disruptive activists—not necessarily
curbing violence—was the control unit’s original focus.
The judiciary’s rejection of confining prisoners for the extended term
in the control unit on the charge of instigating or participating in a labor
stoppage helped drive the BOP’s decision to tighten the controls at Marion’s
General Population and to change the prison’s purpose into one of
segregating dangerous or disruptive prisoners. 75 This tightening of controls
resulted in numerous prisoners again being sent to the control unit in the mid1970s. The only difference was that this time prisoners were not assigned to
70

Adams, 368 F. Supp. at 1053.
Id.
72
Id. at 1053–54.
73
Michael Deutsch, The Road from Attica: Mass Incarceration and the Emergence of Control Unit
Prisons 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with journal); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?,
36 FORDHAM URB . L.J. 53, 55–56 (2009) (noting the dissonance between the use of disproportionality
Eighth Amendment theory in sentencing and its absence in conditions of confinement jurisprudence and
arguing for its potential use in challenging solitary confinement).
74
The purpose of the control unit was officially described by the BOP as “to separate those offenders
whose behavior seriously disrupted the orderly operation of an institution from the vast majority of
offenders who wish to participate in regular institutional programs.” D AVID A. WARD & ALLEN F. BREED,
THE UNITED STATES PENITENTIARY, MARION, ILLINOIS: A REPORT TO THE J UDICIARY COMMITTEE, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1984), reprinted in Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 9, 10 (1985)
(citing Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement, 5212.1, June 1973). Interestingly, the control unit’s original
purpose said nothing about protecting prisoners and staff from violence.
75
Deutsch, supra note 73; Telephone Interview with Michael Deutsch, lead counsel in Adams v.
Carlson (Sept. 26, 2019). David Ward and Alan Breed state that the new classification system and the
changed purpose of Marion had to do with increasing acts of violence and gang activity throughout the
federal system in the late 1970s. WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 10–11.
71
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the control unit for disciplinary infractions, which the courts had rejected,
but as a so-called administrative, preventive measure. Marion officials
claimed that disruptive prisoners were not being punished for specific acts—
for which they would have to be found guilty of misconduct at a disciplinary
hearing and subjected to proportionate punishment—but were rather
classified to indefinite administrative segregation for being unable “to adjust
to an open institutional setting.”76 The officials dubbed the harsh segregation
imposed on the prisoners as a “special treatment program,” and the control
unit was termed the “Control Unit Treatment Program.”77
Again, the prisoners resorted to court action. In Bono v. Saxbe, the
prisoner class alleged substantive and procedural due process violations in
their placement in the control unit, as well as an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the conditions in the unit, which now included 23.5 hours per
day in the cell, no group programming, handcuffing prisoners whenever they
left their cells except during showers and recreation, subjecting them to
humiliating rectal searches, and denying them any contact visits with family
or friends. 78 The control unit included cells in one wing with solid steel doors
which were termed “boxcar” cells.79 Several prisoners had committed suicide
in these harsh, isolating conditions, and prisoners had been confined there
because they were activists, critics, jailhouse lawyers, or had influence over
other prison activists.80 The named plaintiff, Victor Bono, was “a writer,
artist, and well-respected long term prisoner” who posed no threat to other
prisoners and was only in the control unit due to the two murders that had
landed him in prison years before.81
Judge Foreman generally rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and denied
injunctive relief, primarily because he found that use of the control unit to
“prevent future disruptions within the institution” was rational and did not
constitute punishment.82 Nonetheless, the court found that in some cases,
allowing prison officials to place prisoners in the control unit when they
engaged in the “disruption of the orderly operation of a prison” let officials
silence “prison critics,” “religious leaders,” and “economical and
philosophical dissidents.” Oftentimes, “no showing was made as to how

76
Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 941 (E.D. Ill. 1978), supplemented by 462 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.
Ill. 1978); see also Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13.
77
Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13.
78
450 F. Supp. at 938–40, 946.
79
Id. at 946.
80
Deutsch, supra note 73, at 13–15.
81
Id. at 15.
82
Bono, 450 F. Supp. at 944.
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these persons disrupted the orderly running of the institution.”83 The court
also found that placing prisoners in the control unit solely on the basis of the
crime for which they were convicted violated due process because “no
reasonable prediction of an inmate’s behavior in the prison could be based
on the crime for which he was convicted,” nor could an inmate be “punished”
for a specific offense by being placed in the control unit, as bypassing the
inmate discipline procedure violated BOP policy. 84 The court ordered new
hearings for all the prisoners in the control unit. 85 It also found that the use
of “boxcar” cells, with solid steel fronts—a feature that later was to become
standard at supermaxes 86—constituted cruel and unusual punishment and
enjoined their use.87
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision that placing
prisoners in the control unit did not violate the Eighth Amendment, finding
that “when the Control Unit is used as a preventive measure, the decision to
place a prisoner there is not a violation of substantive due process or of the
Eighth Amendment.”88 What clearly motivated both the district court and
court of appeals was not merely controlling dangerously violent prisoners,
but also that prison officials “have an obligation to society in general to keep
prisons operating in an orderly manner, and segregation of those who disrupt
these institutions is a reasonable way to meet this obligation.” 89 The threat of
prison disruption, work stoppages, and other collective action, which the
district court in Adams v. Carlton termed akin to “an outright mutiny,” 90 was
at that point driving the creation of the control unit and the tightening of
conditions at Marion generally.
In 1979, before major violence broke out at Marion, a Task Force of the
Bureau of Prisons recommended that the entire Marion prison be made into
a modified control unit.91 Action on that recommendation was deferred, at
least in part because the BOP authorities were concerned about its legality
and that such action would fare badly in federal court.92 However, in 1979,
the BOP did add a new, higher security classification to its system, reserving
83

Id. at 943.
Id.
85
Id.
86
See, e.g., Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (describing cells at
Ohio supermax as having “solid metal door[s]”).
87
Bono, 450 F. Supp. at 937, 947.
88
Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis omitted).
89
Id. at 616.
90
352 F. Supp. 882, 885–86 (E.D. Ill. 1973).
91
See WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 11.
92
Telephone Interview with David A. Ward, former Professor, Univ. of Minn. (Oct. 1, 2019).
84

176

115:159 (2020)

Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration

Level 6 (Marion) for “all violent, assaultive, and . . . disruptive inmates.”93
Prison officials within Marion were also considering a general lockdown
before the outbreak of major violence there, and thus implemented stricter
controls.
Prisoners responded to stricter conditions with several major work
stoppages in the early 1980s which eventually led prison officials to close
the industrial work program at Marion and transfer the machinery used to
another prison. 94 In 1983, after several brutal murders and a dramatic
increase in violence at Marion, the entire prison was placed on lockdown
status, where prisoners were held in solitary confinement.95 The lockdown
continued on a permanent basis, and, as recounted earlier, was eventually
upheld by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruscino v. Carlson as a
rational reaction to the extreme violence at Marion in 1983.96
The Marion experience, which laid the foundation for increased use of
prolonged solitary confinement in the 1980s and ’90s, undermines the view
that the rise of mass solitary in the form of control units and supermaxes was
simply a response to increasing violence in prisons. Instead, the control unit
developed in response to political, nonviolent disturbances, such as protests
against guard abuses or prisoner grievances. The change in Marion’s
character from a general population prison to a solitary confinement unit had
been planned even before the spate of violence in 1983 which purportedly
made the BOP institute the lockdown, leading to suspicions that, as the
American Civil Liberties Union put it in congressional testimony, the Bureau
was using the murders at Marion as a “pretext to further change the character
of Marion.”97 Moreover, the BOP used Marion to isolate prisoners who had
not necessarily proven to be violent in prisons, but who were political
radicals or revolutionaries.98 As Marion Warden Ralph Aron testified in
93

WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 10–11.
Id. at 12.
95
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988).
96
Id.
97
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 62–63 (Executive Summary of the ACLU National Prison
Project Testimony, June 26, 1985, in the Subcomm. on the Courts, Civil Liberties & the Admin. of
Justice).
98
For example, Leonard Peltier, the American Indian Movement leader, Sekou Odinga, member of
the Black Liberation Army, Alan Berkman, a former doctor who was a medium-security prisoner with no
history of violence in prison but a political radical, Sundiata Acoli, Black Panther/Black Liberation Army
member, Ray Levasseur, a white political radical, Puerto Rican Nationalists, and other activists such as
Oscar López Rivera, Rafael Cancel Miranda, Kojo Grailing Brown, and Tim Blunk were all transferred
to Marion despite having no history of violence in prison. N ANCY KURSHAN, OUT OF CONTROL: A
FIFTEEN-YEAR BATTLE AGAINST CONTROL UNIT PRISONS , at viii, xi, 39, 133, 183–84 (2013); THE NAT’L
COMM. TO FREE PUERTO R ICAN POLITICAL PRISONERS & POWS & THE COMM. TO END THE MARION
94
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1975, “The purpose of the Marion control unit [was] to control revolutionary
attitudes in the prison system and the society at large.” 99

II. SUPERMAX AND CONTROL OF DISRUPTIVE OR
REBELLIOUS PRISONERS
The spate of prison work stoppages and other collective protests was
not confined to Marion. 100 Prisons are a microcosm of society, and the
increasingly rebellious civil rights movement, along with other political and
social movements of the ’60s and ’70s, spilled over into prisons.101 That era
witnessed a wave of prison protests. These were often labor protests, but
generally had a “broader vision,” with prisoners protesting “against a host of
inequities and dehumanizing aspects of their imprisonment.” 102 Those strikes
and protests were influenced by civil rights movements, and they helped
create a prisoners’ rights movement that continues to this day. 103 Prisoners

LOCKDOWN, MASS INCARCERATION AND CONTROL UNITS : CRIME CONTROL OR SOCIAL CONTROL? 6–
16
(1995),
https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Finder/DOC3_scans/3.mass.incarceration.control.units.19
95.pdf [https://perma.cc/23A4-BKAR]; FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 2.
99
Steve Whitman, The Marion Penitentiary: It Should Be Opened up, not Locked Down, SOUTHERN
ILLINOSIAN, Aug. 7, 1988, at D25; see also Alan Eladio Gómez, Resisting Living Death at Marion
Federal Penitentiary, 1972, 96 RADICAL H IST. REV. 58, 61, 80 n.10 (2006) (citing testimony in Bono v.
Saxbe, 462 F. Supp. 146 (7th Cir. 1978)); E-mail from Michael Deutsch, lead counsel in Bono v. Saxbe,
to author (Oct. 31, 2019) (on file with journal).
100
See Note, Striking the Right Balance: Toward a Better Understanding of Prison Strikes,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1497–1500 (2019) [hereinafter Striking the Right Balance]; see also Gómez,
supra note 99, at 65 (prisoners’ struggle emerged strongest in early 1970s).
101
See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 2 (opening statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice); id. at 149 (statement of
Norman Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons); see also LARRY SIEGEL & CLEMENS BARTOLLAS ,
CORRECTIONS TODAY 158–59 (4th ed. 2016) (“Donald Clemmer’s classic study of the prison community
at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois . . . notes the existence of numerous parallels between prison
and the free world. Clemmer writes, ‘In a sense the prison culture reflects the American culture, for it is
a culture within it.’ [But] [s]ome argue that rather than the prison being a microcosm of the larger society,
it is a distorted image of that society. In its analysis of the 1971 Attica Prison rebellion, the New York
State Special Commission on Attica stated, ‘While it is a microcosm reflecting the forces and emotions
of the larger society, the prison actually magnifies and intensifies these forces, because it is so
enclosed.’”); Interview by Jonah Walters with Heather Ann Thompson, Professor, Univ. of Mich.,
available at https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/prisons-coronavirus-pandemic-heather-ann-thompson/
[https://perma.cc/FD24-FD6W] (“Prisons really are microcosms of the broader society.”).
102
Striking the Right Balance, supra note 100, at 1498–99.
103
See, e.g., ERIC CUMMINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF CALIFORNIA’S RADICAL PRISON MOVEMENT
126–27 (1994) (discussing the organizing of California’s prison movement and the influence of the
radical political movement in California); Striking the Right Balance, supra note 100, at 1499–1500.
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sought in many cases to organize unions. 104 The increasing influence of Black
Muslim—and later Black Panther—protests were signs of a “wider
discontent among inmates.”105 And often, prisoners’ discontent resulted not
only in work stoppages but in riots when their grievances were ignored or
inadequately addressed. More than 300 prison riots occurred across the
United States between 1971 and 1986.106
The establishment of the control unit at Marion followed shortly after
the riot and the brutal retaking of the prison at Attica in 1971, as well as
revolutionary African-American prisoner George Jackson’s killing by prison
guards several weeks earlier in California.107 As Professor Keramet Reiter
recounts, prison guards and wardens, such as Carl Larson of California,
believed that the civil rights and social justice movement outside of prisons
aligned with a Black-led, revolutionary, and violent movement inside
prisons. As Larson describes,
We had this ‘revolution,’ and it manifested itself with a lot of rhetoric . . . and
thought. [But] in the prisons, it manifested in a lot of violence . . . The Black
Guerilla Family and the Black Panthers, they had a political side . . . but they
were mostly gangs, mafia.108

For Larson and other prison officials, the “national revolutionary movement
that culminated with George Jackson” was critical to the understanding of
why California built its supermax and the BOP created the Marion Control
Unit.109 The “Angola Three” case, where three Black Panther members were
placed in solitary for what would be decades based on their political
ideology, is another illustration of prison officials reacting to the black
revolutionary movement—irrespective of violence—to place radicals and
activists in solitary.110
104
CUMMINS , supra note 103, at 252–53 (recounting how in the mid-1970s, the California Prisoners’
Union came close to recognition); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121
(1977) (rejecting claims by prisoners to be allowed to organize unions and have union meetings).
105
CUMMINS , supra note 103, at 79; see generally DAN BERGER, CAPTIVE NATION: BLACK PRISON
ORGANIZING IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2014) (discussing the influence of Black Muslims and Black
Panthers in Black prison organizing).
106
REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 57; see also BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE :
U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971–1986, at 3 (1991).
107
See REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 45–51 (recounting the details of Jackson’s alleged attempted
escape with a gun and the bloody aftermath that followed). For a thorough review of the Attica events,
see THOMPSON, supra note 56.
108
REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 40.
109
See id. at 52; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing view of Marion warden
that solitary was designed to curb revolutionary ideas and movements).
110
See ROBERT HILLARY KING, FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE HEAP: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK
PANTHER ROBERT H ILLARY KING 21 (2009). See generally ALBERT WOODFOX WITH LESLIE GEORGE,
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That control of collective activity and radical thought has been a
primary goal of supermax confinement is illustrated by officials’ often
punitive reaction to hunger strikes and other forms of nonviolent protest and
statements by prisoners. In 2012, when California Security Housing Unit
(SHU) prisoners engaged in nonviolent hunger strikes as what they felt was
the only method left to publicize their prolonged solitary confinement after
grievances and lawsuits had failed, California prison officials punished them
through disciplinary proceedings for participating in or leading the strike. 111
In 2012, prisoner representatives from different ethnic groups signed on to
an Agreement to End Hostilities between the different racial groups that
make up the California prison system in a collective effort to end the racial
violence that had beset the California prisons for decades. 112 In response,
California officials stated in the Ashker v. Brown litigation that the
Agreement was evidence of the continuing threat to prison security posed by
the plaintiffs in that it showed the “influence” they had over other prisoners
in the prisons.113 Breaking the control and influence of these leaders was
paramount to prison officials, even though the leaders’ influence was being
used to put an end to racial violence in California prisons. 114
Moreover, prison officials were beset by increasing litigation, both
from civil rights lawyers and from prisoners themselves, which began to
place significant restrictions on what had been the virtually absolute
discretion of officials to manage prisoners. 115 Just as civil rights protests and
SOLITARY (2019) (recounting his experience serving four decades in solitary confinement as one of the
Angola 3); ANGOLA 3: BLACK PANTHERS AND THE LAST SLAVE PLANTATION (Obstacle Illusions 2008)
(recounting the story of the Angola 3 and their record stay in solitary confinement); I N THE LAND OF THE
FREE . . . (The Mob Film Company 2010) (same).
111
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ⁋⁋ 157, 164, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012).
112
PELICAN BAY STATE PRISON-SECURITY H OUSING UNIT SHORT CORRIDOR HUNGER STRIKE
REPRESENTATIVES,
AGREEMENT
TO
END
HOSTILITIES
(2012),
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Agreement%20to%20End%20Hostilities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7H6U-BNG5] [hereinafter AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES].
113
Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, or
Alternatively, to Stay; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 2 & n.1, Ruiz v. Brown, No. 4:09 -cv05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2012).
114
While it is possible to argue that the Agreement did demonstrate the influence that the leaders of
the hunger strikes had in the California prisons and that such influence could be used for negative
purposes, the point is that the Agreement had as its objective an incredibly positive goal—namely ending
the ethnic violence in California prisons. California ignored that goal because it was so focused on
breaking these leaders’ influence over other prisoners. See AGREEMENT TO END HOSTILITIES, supra note
112.
115
See CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 80–82 (explaining how the enormous flood of habeas petitions
from California state prisoners left prison officials unsure how to respond); MALCOLM M. FEELEY &
EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: H OW THE COURTS REFORMED
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litigation were legally dismantling Jim Crow, the combination of prison
protests and litigation was eliminating the “Plantation Model” which had
been ensconced in southern prisons until the 1970s, and more generally
limiting the ability officials had to punish and control prisoners. 116
An increase in collective prison action in the 1970s and 1980s,
combined with an increase in successful prisoner litigation, determinate
sentencing reforms, and the rise of prison gangs during this period led
officials to conclude their prisons were out of control and they had lost their
traditional management tools.117 As Professor Reiter points out in discussing
California prisons: “California prison officials seemed to be losing both their
autonomy to run their prisons free from public scrutiny and their discretion
over the intensity and severity of prisoners’ punishments.”118 Both officials
and politicians responded by proposing and designing harsher forms of
managing the prisoners they perceived to be most dangerous to the prison
order—the “George Jacksons.”119 As early as 1972, at around the same time
the Marion Control Unit was established, California Governor Ronald
Reagan called for the development of new, high-tech maximum-security
prisons to incarcerate troublemaking convicts. 120
The rise of mass solitary confinement thus springs from the same root
cause that critical theorists identify as inspiring mass incarceration: the need
to develop new mechanisms of social control to replace an old order thrown
into turmoil by mass protests, litigation, and changing societal attitudes. 121 In
AMERICA’ S PRISONS 30–51 (1998) (describing first what the authors term the “hands-off era” of federal
court responses to prisoner complaints which accorded prison officials virtually complete discretion over
running prisons and then recounting the dramatic effect of prison litigation).
116
See generally Malcom M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 PACE L. REV. 433
(2004) (exploring why judicial intervention has been successful in dismantling the “Plantation Model”
and other forms of maltreatment against prisoners); Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-inamerica/406177/ [https://perma.cc/2ZGH-RFWZ] (explaining that at Angola, where inmates can be
forced to work without compensation under threat of punishment as severe as solitary confinement,
slavery never ended but, in fact, was merely reinvented).
117
REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 84.
118
Id. at 78.
119
Id. at 84; see also CUMMINS, supra note 103, at 248.
120
CUMMINS , supra note 103, at 248 & n.94.
121
ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 13 (arguing that mass incarceration developed as a reaction to the
demise of Jim Crow as a mechanism of social control and represented a new form of social control);
Wacquant, supra note 20, at 52 (explaining that mass incarceration represented the backlash against the
advances won by the social movements and “offered itself as the universal and simplex solution to all
manners of social problems,” particularly the violent urban upheavals of the mid-’60s; “[a]s the walls of
the ghetto shook and threatened to crumble, the walls of the prison were correspondingly extended,
enlarged and fortified.”).
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both cases of mass isolation and removal from society, the political technique
involved the imagery of a violent, predatory monster who was no longer
perceived to be human.
The supermax and the rise of mass prolonged solitary confinement
“represent the application of sophisticated, modern technology dedicated
entirely to the task of social control.”122 Moreover, as with mass
incarceration, the supermax represents a form of control different from, yet
connected to, the racist practices used to brutalize, control, and subordinate
African Americans in the plantation system and convict labor system of
previous eras. As Professor Angela Davis argues:
The ultimate manifestation of this phenomenon [of racism in the prison system]
can be found in the supermax prison, whose main function is to subdue and
control “problematic” imprisoned populations—again, composed largely of
black men—who, having been locked away in the most remote and invisible of
spaces, basically are no longer thought of as human.123

Mass solitary functions as a form of social control against disobedient,
disruptive, rebellious, or violent prisoners using three main mechanisms. The
first, and most obvious, is long-term, total physical isolation. The modern
supermax uses sophisticated technology to ensure minimal contact between
staff and prisoners combined with maximum and usually remote surveillance
of each prisoner.124 This minimizes potential for either individual attacks on
staff or other prisoners or collective action by prisoners.125
Second, and equally important, is the element of psychological control,
effectuated by not only the physical isolation, but the various psychological
elements used to attempt to break the spirit and resistance of the prisoner.
Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the
deprivation of reading materials and personal photographs for particularly
disruptive prisoners at the Pennsylvania supermax, which the majority of the

122
Craig Haney, “Infamous Punishment”: The Psychological Consequences of Isolation, N AT ’ L
PRISON PROJECT J. 3, 3 (1993).
123
Angela Y. Davis, Race, Gender, and Prison History: From the Convict Lease System to the
Supermax Prison, in PRISON MASCULINITIES 35, 44 (Don Sabo, Terry A. Kupers, & Willie London eds.,
2001).
124
See Haney, supra note 122, at 3; see generally Charles A. Pettigrew, Technology and the Eighth
Amendment: The Problem of Supermax Prisons, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 191, 194–98 (2002) (discussing how
“[a]dvanced technology distinguishes Supermax prisons from their conventional counterparts and allows
for the isolation of prisoners”).
125
Pettigrew, supra note 124, at 195. However, this potential is not entirely eliminated, as the various
hunger strikes by prisoners at California’s Pelican Bay Security Housing Unit (SHU) illustrate.
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court upheld as a rational behavioral-management effort, as coming
“perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control.”126
California’s policy to break prisoners placed in the SHU for alleged
gang affiliation was to condition release from isolation on the prisoner
becoming an informant.127 In California, the attempt to break the prisoner
through informing (known as “debriefing”) included conditioning virtually
any human contact on debriefing. 128 In one such instance, a prisoner was told
after his parent died that the only way he could receive any additional phone
calls to his family was by becoming an informant. 129
Behavioral management control is ubiquitous in supermax prisons and
control units, another legacy of the Marion experience. An article published
in Corrections Management Quarterly tellingly concluded that “in control
units[,] mind control is a primary weapon.”130 As John McCain reflected on
his experience of solitary confinement as a prisoner of war: “It’s an awful
thing, solitary. It crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more
effectively than any other form of mistreatment.” 131
Finally, the supermax, and officials’ invocation of the need to protect
inmates and staff from the dangerous, pathological predator, allowed prison
officials to recover in certain respects the near absolute discretion and
authority of a bygone era.132 While the first legal challenges of the early

126
Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 552 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contra id. at 531 (majority
opinion).
127
REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 145–46 (revealing through personal narratives of prisoners that
the only ways to get out of the SHU are “parole, snitch, or die”).
128
Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10, 13–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (recounting the district court opinion
holding that keeping Griffin in isolation in Pelican Bay SHU for twenty years with his only way out being
becoming an informant and thereby risking his and his family’s safety violated the Eighth Amendment);
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at ⁋ 7 (“Plaintiffs’ and class members’ only way
out of isolation is to ‘debrief’ to prison administrators (i.e., report on the gang activity of other
prisoners) . . . . Accordingly, for those many prisoners who refuse or are unable to debrief, defendants’
policies result in ‘effectively permanent’ solitary confinement.”); REITER, 23/7, supra note 11, at 145–46
(particularly for inmates with life sentences, “[s]nitching was the only way [prisoners] could expect to
leave the SHU alive”).
129
See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, at ⁋ 52 (recounting that after a
prisoner’s mother died he was allowed to make a phone call, which was the only call to family or friends
that he had been allowed in nine years, but was immediately told by prison officials “to think about taking
advantage of the debriefing program”).
130
Rodney J. Henningsen, W. Wesley Johnson & Terry Wells, Supermax Prisons: Panacea or
Desperation?, 3 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 53, 58 (1999).
131
JOHN MCCAIN & MARK SALTER, FAITH OF MY FATHERS 206 (1999).
132
See REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at 5, 7 (“Sociolegal scholars call the resulting pattern of
compliance ‘legal endogeneity’: courts impose minimum standards of humane treatment, prison officials
redefine minimum standards as establishing prisoners’ maximum privileges, and the courts defer. . . .
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1970s imposed some significant restraints on official discretion, 133 by the
mid- to late 1990s, the courts had developed a largely hands-off policy on
administrative segregation and supermax confinement. 134 Even the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wilkinson v. Austin in 2005 recognized that prisoners had
a liberty interest in avoiding prolonged solitary confinement in the Ohio
supermax, although the Court only required prison officials to follow
minimal due process procedures. 135 The upshot of the judiciary’s legitimation
of supermax confinement was that for decades officials had almost absolute
control over who could be placed in the supermax and for how long and,
short of physical brutality, the treatment they received once so placed. As
Professor Davis has argued, this absolute authority is reminiscent of the
impunity with which the convict lease system operated in total disregard of
the humanity of the mostly Black prisoners.136
In a sense, the supermax perfected the disciplinary, social control
functions of the modern prison first articulated by the brilliant French
philosopher Michel Foucault.137 Foucault explains the modern prison as a
panoptic method of control, in which the architecture of the prison is adopted
for constant surveillance, which along with branding the individual as
“dangerous/harmless” or “normal/abnormal,” permits the state to engage in
“coercive assignment” and control and regulate behavior.138 Interestingly,

[W]hen officials said the prisoners in Pelican Bay were uniformly dangerous and that the [supermax] was
absolutely necessary, judges took them at their word.”).
133
See supra notes 115–116 and the prison litigation described in REITER, 23/7, supra note 14, at
68–70.
134
See In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464
(4th Cir. 1999), abrogation recognized by Latson v. Clarke, 794 F. App’x. 266, 270 (4th Cir. 2019);
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 168 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–
86 (1995) (explaining that thirty days in solitary confinement did not constitute an “atypical and
significant hardship” giving rise to a liberty interest requiring prison officials to accord prisoners any due
process prior to placement).
135
545 U.S. 209, 229–30 (2005).
136
Davis, supra note 123, at 44; see also Convict Leasing, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://eji.org/news/history-racial-injustice-convict-leasing/ [https://perma.cc/L5YV-TGHT] (“After the
Civil War, slavery persisted in the form of convict leasing, a system in which Southern states leased
prisoners to private railways, mines, and large plantations. While states profited, prisoners earned no pay
and faced inhumane, dangerous, and often deadly work conditions. Thousands of black people were
forced into what authors have termed ‘slavery by another name’ until the 1930s.”). Convict leasing was
thus clearly related to the plantation model of prisons. Benns, supra note 116.
137
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, D ISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 201–02 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977).
138
Id. at 199–210; see also Sandra McGunigall-Smith & Robert Johnson, Escape from Death Row:
A Study of “Tripping” as an Individual Adjustment Strategy Among Death Row Prisoners, 6 PIERCE L.
REV. 533, 543 (2008) (“SHUs are the epitome of the panoptic gaze that lay at the heart of the disciplinary
society envisioned by Foucault.”).
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given today’s coronavirus context, Foucault traces the origins of the modern
prison system to towns consumed by medieval plague, where the people
were isolated from each other and subjected to constant surveillance. 139 He
also notes the turn to solitary confinement in French history, following a
period of political agitation and revolt: “The wave of revolt . . . and perhaps
the general agitation in the country in the years 1842–3 resulted in the
adoption in 1844 of the Pennsylvanian régime of absolute isolation . . . .”140
In the United States, the rise of mass solitary, as with the growth of
mass incarceration, was racially discriminatory. Various studies indicate that
the racial disparities that characterize the prison population generally, as
compared to the United States population as a whole, are replicated amongst
those placed in solitary confinement, although not in as extreme a form. A
1980 statistical analysis of a single medium-security prison in the South
demonstrated, albeit on a small scale, “that the race of an inmate was
correlated with the disciplinary decisions of correctional officers.”141 The
study found that “black and white inmates were equally likely to engage in
rule-breaking activity,” yet “they were not equally likely to be reported for
rule infractions.”142 Similarly, when Wisconsin opened its supermax prison,
of its first 215 inmates, approximately 60% were African-American, with
Hispanics constituting almost all of the rest. 143 These statistics are startling
in a state where 46% of the prison inmates were African-American and 17%
were Hispanic, and yet only 5% of the state’s population was AfricanAmerican and less than 2% was Hispanic. 144
More recently, the 2014 ASCA-Liman Report found that in the twentytwo reporting jurisdictions, African-American males constituted 48% of the
139

Foucault writes that in a medieval town consumed by the plague:

Each individual is fixed in his place. And, if he moves, he does so at the risk of his life, contagion
or punishment. Inspection functions ceaselessly. The gaze is alert everywhere: ‘A considera ble
body of militia, commanded by good officers and men of substance’, guards at the gates, at the
town hall and in every quarter to ensure the prompt obedience of the people and the most absolute
authority of the magistrates, ‘as also to observe all disorder, theft and extortion’. At each of the
town gates there will be an observation post; at the end of each street sentinels.
FOUCAULT, supra note 137, at 195–96.
140
Id. at 318 n.6. That adoption was short-lived and repealed in 1847. Id.
141
Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 759, 761
(2015).
142
Id. at 765 (quoting Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule Breaking, and
Disciplinary Response: A Study of Discretionary Decision Making in Prison, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 931,
944 (1980)).
143
Jerry R. DeMaio, Comment, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat of Overclassification in
Wisconsin’s Supermax Prison, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 207, 229.
144
Id. at 229 n.129.
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male population in administrative segregation, as compared to 39% of the
general prison population.145 The reported demographics for female prisoners
demonstrated an even more significant racial disparity, with Black female
prisoners constituting only 23% of the total female custodial population but
35% of the female restricted housing population across the jurisdictions
reporting.146 Those statistics do not include California, which did not
participate in the ASCA-Liman study, 147 and has an extremely
disproportionate racial/ethnic balance in its usage of solitary. In California,
“Latinos made up 42 percent of the general prison population, but 86 percent
of those in solitary confinement. Whites, by contrast, were 22 percent of the
general population, but only nine percent of those in solitary.”148
In 2016, the New York Times published a comprehensive report finding
that “racial disparities were embedded in the [state] prison experience in
New York.”149 According to the report, Black and Latino prisoners were
disciplined at higher rates than white prisoners—in some cases twice as
often—and were sent to solitary confinement more frequently and for longer
durations than their white counterparts.150 “At Clinton, a prison near the
Canadian border where only one of the 998 guards is African-American,
black inmates were nearly four times as likely to be sent to isolation as
whites, and they were held there for an average of 125 days, compared to 90
days for whites.”151 The disparities in disciplinary sanctions were often
greatest for “vaguely defined” infractions that gave discretion to officers and
did not require production of physical evidence, like disobeying a direct
order.152 Indeed, vaguely defined infractions have been a powerful tool in
perpetuating supermax facilities and prolonged solitary confinement. In a
state where Blacks make up only 14% of the general population but nearly
half of the prison population,153 these reports indicate that the racial character
of mass incarceration is repeated in the use of mass solitary confinement. As
145

TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 13, at 31.
Id. at 36.
147
Id. at 76 n.101.
148
Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, The Link Between Race and Solitary Confinement, ATLANTIC (Dec.
5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/race-solitary-confinement/509456/
[https://perma.cc/LAQ8-ZHWF].
149
Michael Schwirtz, Michael Winerip & Robert Gebeloff, The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York
State’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-yorkstate-prisons-inmates-racial-bias.html [https://perma.cc/7EE3-VQYA]. This report was based on tens of
thousands of disciplinary cases against New York State prisoners. Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. (emphasis added).
152
Id.
153
Id.
146
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with mass incarceration, mass solitary constitutes a racialized system of
control.154
The problem of how to reassert social and political control in the wake
of civil rights protests, urban rebellions and prison work stoppages, protests,
and riots of the ’60s and ’70s drove both political leaders and prison officials
to develop new mechanisms of control. By utilizing the narrative of the
increasing violence and disruption in American society and prisons, officials
were able to institute both the massive increase of incarceration and the rise
of the supermax within prisons to isolate people from society and humanity
in an attempt to end racial and political protest and change.
III. THE PREVENTIVE MODEL
The Marion experience also illustrates the shift from the disciplinary
model of placing people in solitary for determinate periods of time as
punishment for specific misconduct, utilized generally throughout the
twentieth century, to the preventive model of the modern supermax, where
prisoners are held in solitary indefinitely as a measure to prevent future
violence or disturbances. The preventive paradigm utilizes exceedingly
vague criteria containing no clear indication to prisoners as to what conduct
will result in their placement in solitary and how they can eventually earn
their release. 155 Prison officials argue that because solitary confinement is not
“punitive” but instead “preventive,” prisoners are afforded less rights and the
actions of officials are to be accorded less scrutiny by the courts.156 This

154
Professor Andrea Armstrong writes, “[M]inority offenders may be more likely to be perceived as
a disciplinary threat by correctional officers, regardless of an offender’s actual behavior.” Armstrong,
supra note 141, at 770 (emphasis omitted). Moreover, the implicit biases of prison guards is particularly
relevant in cases of “minor or ambiguous conduct charges” where “‘vaguely worded “catchall” rules’ . . .
almost always pertain to an inmate’s attitude rather than conduct” because these rules are “especially
susceptible to . . . influence by an individual prison guard’s implicit racial preferences.” Id. at 770–72
(emphases omitted).
155
See Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 n.14 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“The memorandum
lists the following behavior as criteria for classification to high maximum security status: The inmate’s
conduct or continued presence at the sending institution poses a serious threat to . . . the security of the
prison; The nature of the inmate’s criminal offense indicates that the inmate poses a serious threat to the
physical safety of any person, or to the security of the prison . . . .”); Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d
766, 771–72 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (stating that a prisoner was retained in indefinite solitary confinement for a
period of thirty-six years despite having committed no serious misconduct for the last twenty-eight years,
on the basis of his escape history and undefined “threats to harm others”).
156
Ohio argued in the Supreme Court case of Wilkinson v. Austin that because their decisions in
placing prisoners in the supermax were predictive of dangerousness, namely preventive, they did not have
to accord the prisoners the full due process protections provided for disciplinary proceedings. Brief for
Petitioners at 19–20, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–29 (2005) (No. 04-495) (“[W]here the
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paradigm allows prison officials wide discretion to assert control over certain
allegedly disruptive prisoners and the ability to threaten the rest of the prison
population with similar consequences if they misbehave or associate with the
wrong people. The ascent of the preventive paradigm for prolonged solitary
confinement is thus tied to the rise of the “violent prisoner” narrative and the
use of the supermax to reassert officials’ control. 157
Judicial decisions affirm the dichotomy between disciplinary and
preventive detention, as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wilkinson v. Austin
demonstrates. In Wilkinson, the Court upheld a lower court’s finding that
prisoners had a liberty interest in avoiding placement in Ohio State
Penitentiary (OSP), the Ohio supermax. However, the Court determined that
the due process requirements for prisoners facing indeterminate solitary
confinement for preventive reasons are minimal. 158 The upshot of that
decision was that a prisoner in Ohio accused of murdering another prisoner,
for example, could be disciplined and sent to segregation for a determinate
term, after a due process hearing which comported with the protections set
forth by the Court in Wolff v. McDonnell.159 Yet, officials could also send a
prisoner to supermax for years for relatively minor offenses while affording
them less and weaker due process protections. For instance, one of the named
plaintiffs in Wilkinson, Daryl Heard, was charged with conspiring to bring
marijuana into the prison and “punished” by receiving fifteen days in
disciplinary segregation. He then was transferred from a medium-security
prison to the supermax as a “preventive” administrative measure for drug
distribution, with only minimal due process, and kept in the supermax for
years.160 Indeed the district court in Wilkinson found that more than fifty
people in Ohio were transferred to the supermax even though they had
committed no violence in prison and their only rules violation was drug
involvement while in prison.161 Like mass incarceration, the use of solitary
confinement as a preventive measure is often justified by the desire to limit
gang violence. While gangs undoubtedly present serious problems in
prisons, the preventive paradigm is problematic because it allows prison

decision is predictive, the other Mathews factors, especially the private interest affected [namely, the
prisoner’s interest], carry very little weight, if any.”).
157
See supra Part I (discussing violent prisoner narrative) and Part II (discussing supermaxes and
prison officials reasserting their control).
158
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–29 (2005).
159
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
160
Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 730, 731 n.14.
161
Id. at 736.
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administrators broad discretion to send and confine prisoners to supermax
facilities.162
The preventive paradigm for supermax confinement reached its apex in
California’s Security Housing Unit (SHU) at Pelican Bay State Prison.
There, any California prisoner allegedly affiliated with a prison gang could
be sent to solitary confinement based simply on their association, without
any evidence or act of prison misconduct.163 In 2011, more than 1,000
prisoners were assigned to preventive, so-called “administrative” detention,
and held in very isolating conditions. Prisoners were confined to small,
eighty-square-foot windowless cells for 22.5 to 24 hours per day.164 Phone
calls with family or friends were prohibited, as were contact visits with any
visitors. Prisoners left their cells only for approximately ninety minutes per
day to recreate alone in a facility with high walls and a partial grate covering
the top so that they received virtually no direct sunlight. The recreation area,
only several times larger than their cells, was devoid of anything but one
handball. While prisoners were able to communicate with each other by
shouting through the walls, social contact was limited, disembodied, and
sometimes punished. The prisoners had virtually no educational or other
programming, and no work or vocational programs. These prisoners had not
seen trees, birds, or grass for years, had not touched another human being
162
Id. at 748–49, 751 (“The Department chose to move Roe to a more secure and more expensive
facility without articulating a single affirmative action he had undertaken. Instead, he was allegedly
moved because of longtime gang membership and his involvement in a racial incident more than five
years ago. These justifications ring hollow . . . . [Similarly,] Thompson had a classification review. The
hearing committee’s worksheet indicated that Thompson had no rules violation findings, no
administrative control placement, and no violence in the last five years . . . . Nonetheless, without any
notice of the evidence claimed against him, the Department sent Thompson to the OSP” and the
reclassification committee’s recommendations to reduce Thompson’s security classification “were denied
because of Thompson’s alleged gang membership”). Under Ohio’s New Policy, which was a reform
measure, a prisoner could be sent to the supermax if he was “identified by the institution Security Threat
Group Coordinator as a leader, enforcer, or recruiter of a security threat group, which is actively involved
in violent or disruptive behavior.” Id. at 751. As the district court pointed out, this provision did not cabin
the Coordinator’s discretion—so long as he or she determined that the inmate was a gang leader, the
prisoner could be sent to the supermax. Id.
163
CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 15, § 3378(c)(4) (2013) (“An associate is an inmate/parolee or any person
who is involved periodically or regularly with members or associates of a gang. This identification
requires at least three (3) independent source items of documentation indicative of association with
validated gang members or associates. Validation of an inmate/parolee or any person as an associate of a
prison gang shall require at least one (1) source item be a direct link to a current or former validated
member or associate of the gang, or to an inmate/parolee or any person who is validated by the department
within six (6) months of the established or estimated date of activity identified in the evidence
considered.”) (repealed 2014).
164
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111. Prisoners were only entitled to a fifteenminute family call in event of an emergency, such as if a close family member died. The amended
complaint contains the facts asserted in the rest of this paragraph. See also REITER, 23/7, supra note 14.
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during their time in the SHU, and many had no visitors due to the isolated
location of the prison.
By 2011, approximately five hundred prisoners at Pelican Bay SHU had
been in solitary confinement for over ten years, seventy-eight of them for
more than two decades.165 For most, there was no way out. They had not been
placed in solitary confinement because of some serious misconduct that they
had committed in prison, nor because of the heinousness of their criminal
offense. Rather, they had been placed in solitary because of an alleged
affiliation or association with a prison gang. They need not be an actual or
alleged gang member; the alleged affiliation need not even rise to the level
of a gang member, and many of the prisoners confined in the Pelican Bay
SHU were classified as associates. 166 A prisoner could be labeled a so-called
“associate”—defined as someone who is not necessarily a member of the
gang but who periodically associates with gang members—and placed in the
SHU.167 Tattoos, artwork, political writings, and greeting cards which
allegedly had some indicia of gang involvement all sufficed for SHU
placement. 168 Moreover, prisoners were not put in solitary for a determinate
term, but rather were housed there indefinitely. Only once every six years
was their placement reviewed, and virtually all were perfunctorily retained

165

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, ¶ 33.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3378 (c)(4) (defining an associate of a gang eligible to be sent to the
Security Housing Unit (SHU) for an indefinite term as “an inmate/parolee or any person who is involved
periodically or regularly with members or associates of a gang”). Under this vague definition almost any
prisoner who had some vague and periodic association with a gang could and often would be sent to the
SHU. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
167
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3378 (c)(4).
168
Prisoners were both placed in SHU initially and then retained there as “active” gang affiliates
based on indicia of so-called gang association such as tattoos, political writings, and artwork. See
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, supra note 111, ¶¶ 93, 104, 105. George Ruiz, a sixty-nine-yearold prisoner, spent twenty-eight years in solitary confinement—twenty-two at the Pelican Bay SHU—
and was denied inactive gang status for his possession of photocopied drawings alleged to contain
symbols associated with a gang. See id. ¶¶ 14, 104. Gabriel Reyes, forty-six, spent fourteen years in
isolation at the Pelican Bay SHU and was also denied inactive status on the basis of a tattoo drawing
found in his cell which included a geometric pattern (known as the G-Shield) that had been “rejected as
a gang-related source item in 1996, 2003, and 2005.” See id. ¶¶ 18, 105. Jeffrey Franklin, fifty-two, spent
twenty-two years in Pelican Bay’s SHU and was denied inactive status after his name appeared on another
prisoner’s gang roster. He was said to be “communicat[ing] by talking” with a validated member of a
different gang thereafter, which was instructed to be considered at his next review. See id. at 15, 106.
166
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in solitary.169 The only practical ways out were to be released from prison, to
become an informant, or to die.170
Placement and retention at Pelican Bay built on the paradigm
established at Marion in the 1970s, where vague standards for who could be
placed in the prison’s control unit—coupled with new guidelines as to who
could be transferred to Marion’s high security General Population—allowed
for a proliferation of arbitrariness in assignment to solitary confinement. 171
Notably, a report investigating the Marion Lockdown concluded that 80% of
inmates at Marion in the fall of 1984 had security ratings that would have
normally required placement at a lower-security institution, not a Level 6
prison, such as Marion. 172 Nonetheless, many of these prisoners were housed
at Marion based on discretionary determinations from administrative
committees, which might have been arbitrary, improper, or dependent on
confidential information which was never disclosed to the prisoner. 173
The 1977 Supreme Court decision in Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, which equated any collective organizing, whether
violent or not, with the potential for disruption, is illustrative of the Court’s
use of the preventive rationale in the prison context. 174 In Jones, the Court
upheld officials’ prohibition of prisoners from soliciting other prisoners to
join the union and of all union meetings. While the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections stated that “[t]he purpose of the union may well
be worthwhile projects,” and the district court held that there was “not one
scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the
operation of the penal institutions,” the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld
the ban because this “historical finding . . . does not state that appellants’
fears as to future disruptions are groundless.”175 Defendants claimed that
once a union was established, even if it had salutary purposes, “[w]ork
stoppages and mutinies are easily foreseeable. Riots and chaos would almost

169
See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Settlement Agreement Based on Systemic Due Process
Violations at 56–57, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017), available at
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2017/11/Mot%20to%20Extend%20Settlement%20REDA
CTED.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XP5-XFNN].
170
Or, in the vernacular, to “parole, snitch, or die.” See Keramet A. Reiter, Parole, Snitch, or Die:
California’s Supermax Prisons and Prisoners, 1997–2007, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’ Y 530, 536 (2012).
171
New assignment guidelines were instituted when the BOP designated Marion as a Level 6, super security prison in 1979. See supra note 93 and accompanying discussion.
172
WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 35.
173
Id.
174
433 U.S. 119 (1977).
175
Id. at 127 & n.5.
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inevitably result.”176 The Supreme Court found those fears rational and
deferred to the expertise of the correctional officials. 177 This same rationale
permitted preventive administrative segregation for individuals who had
committed no violent misconduct, but had the potential to do so in the future.
Both banning unions and creating supermaxes were preventive measures
designed to augment official control over prisoners.
The replacement of typical punishment rationales with preventive and
incapacitation strategies both drove the growth of supermax confinement and
played a significant role in the rise of mass incarceration. As various scholars
have noted, the rise of mass incarceration is associated with an increased
reliance on penal incapacitation as a preventive measure. 178 Starting in the
1970s, the criminal justice system’s focus shifted from punishing past crimes
to the prevention of future misconduct by means of incarceration and the
ongoing control exercised over supposedly dangerous offenders.179 The
enactment of statutes such as “three strikes” laws, which authorize life
sentences for repeat offenders; the criminalization of gang membership and
recruitment; the continuation of detention for “sexual predators” beyond the
service of the criminal sentences; and new sentencing guidelines which
increased the sentence of offenders whose past histories allegedly make them
most likely to commit future crimes, all reflect the shift from a focus on

176

Id. at 127.
Id. at 128–29.
178
Jonathon Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of Imprisonment
from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 239 (2013); see also BRUCE
WESTERN, THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE PRISON BOOM 37–38 (2005) (the prison boom was
fueled by turning the penal system “to the twin tasks of incapacitation and deterrence”); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING & GORDON H AWKINS, I NCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME
8–12 (1995) (tracing shift from rehabilitation to incapacitation and its contribution to mass incarceration);
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (“[T]he new penology is markedly
less concerned with responsibility, fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the
individual offender. Rather, it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings
sorted by dangerousness.”); Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Throw Away the Key or Throw Away the Jail?
The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social Cost, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1027 (2015) (“In the
United States, incapacitation became the predominant logic for the prison boom . . . .”); Jonathan Simon,
Mass Incarceration: From Social Policy to Social Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING
AND CORRECTIONS 23, 28 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (describing the abandonment of
control in California in the 1970s and the increase in incarceration that followed, stating the change
“abandoned the focus on rehabilitation in favor of punitive segregation intended to achieve deterrence
and, more reliably, incapacitative effects”).
179
Robinson, supra note 25; Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998); Lucia Zedner, Seeking Security by Eroding Rights: The Side-Stepping of Due
Process, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 257, 259–61 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007).
177
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punishing criminal behavior to incapacitating dangerous individuals. 180
Another manifestation of the preventive rationale is the continuation of the
criminal justice system’s control over former prisoners and the debilitating
consequences of conviction—ex-felons may be denied the right to vote,
excluded from juries, and relegated to an often “racially segregated and
subordinated existence.”181
Because the preventive paradigm often treats entire groups of people as
dangerous based on their alleged characteristics, its prevalence has produced
significant racial implications. For example, the dramatic rise in the use of
the bail system, which jails mostly poor and African-American people
accused of crime prior to their conviction primarily because of their
presumed dangerousness, reflects the preventive model. 182 Similarly, new
policing tactics that fall heavily on Black and Latino communities, such as
“stop and frisk” and “broken windows,” have as their main ideological
underpinnings the targeting of so-called attributes of dangerousness as a
preventive measure against crime. 183 Inside prisons, states such as California
and Texas have placed thousands of Hispanics into solitary confinement
because of alleged association with gangs. The vagueness of the
dangerousness criteria allowed ethnic identity to often become a proxy for
gang association, which itself was a proxy for dangerousness.184

180
See DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE 9–11 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189106-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GF7V-6F3M]; Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment is Enough?:
Embracing Uncertainty in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J.L. & POL’Y 345 (2016); Robinson, supra
note 25, at 1429–31.
181
ALEXANDER, supra note 19, at 4; Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301 (2015). As Michelle Alexander has argued, these consequences are
an important element of the New Jim Crow, which also has a preventive rationale. ALEXANDER, supra
note 19, at 4.
182
Of the 2.3 million people incarcerated in 2019, more than 20% of them had not been convicted
of a crime but were in preventive pretrial detention. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration,
The
Whole
Pie
2020,
PRISON
POL’ Y
I NITIATIVE
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/3TYR-UGZR]. Over 555,000
people are locked up, mainly in local jails, who have not been convicted of a crime. Due to the high price
of money bail, “people with low incomes are more likely to face the harms of pretrial detention.” Id.; see
also Wendy Sawyer, How Race Impacts Who Is Detained Pretrial, PRISON POL’ Y I NITIATIVE (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2019/10/09/pretrial_race/ [https://perma.cc/AWA8 -JPUN].
183
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (noting the
disproportionate stops of Blacks and Hispanics in holding that the use of stop and frisk without reasonable
suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment).
184
See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237 (2015) (arguing that risk assessment is an unacceptable tool that will exacerbate
racial disparities in the criminal justice system as it has collapsed risk into prior criminal history, which
has become a proxy for race).
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The preventive rationale underlying both mass solitary and mass
incarceration was also fueled by a sense of crisis and permanent emergency,
which has been a prominent feature of post-World War II American
society.185 As noted earlier, riots, disturbances, and other crises in prisons
were traditionally met with temporary lockdowns or discrete periods of
solitary confinement for prisoners who were disruptive. The marked change
that began at Marion was to make the lockdown permanent, borne out of a
sense that the crisis was not temporary. The supermax institutionalized the
concept of permanent lockdown so that the struggle against gangs in prison
required the indefinite, often permanent isolation of any prisoner deemed to
be associated or affiliated with a gang. In that respect, the fight against gangs
in prison can be analogized to the “war on terror” that the Bush
Administration initiated. In response to a perceived existential crisis and a
state of permanent emergency, the preventive paradigm played an important
role in both mass efforts to detain and isolate individuals, with little due
process, for their alleged (and often erroneous) association with dangerous
groups.186
Courts have affirmed the constitutionality of permanent lockdowns in
response to a perceived emergency.187 For example, in response to a threat
from a designated group, the Fourth Circuit approved isolation for any
alleged gang member, noting that in order to forestall a riot or other
disturbance, prison officials may act without any showing that a particular
individual is dangerous.188 According to the court, allowing prison officials
to act only after a demonstration of individual dangerousness would deprive
them of the “all-important option of prevention.”189 By the time of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision, the prisoners had already been isolated for more than three
years, simply due to their alleged affiliation, without any showing of
individual dangerousness or of immediate threat of disorder. 190 The
perception of danger and threat had become permanent. Similarly, in Hewitt
v. Helms, the Supreme Court allowed administrative segregation with only
185

See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1400–04
(1989) (describing the development of permanent emergency mentality, where conceptual crisis is
permanent, and emergency authority, which was once seen as temporary, thereby becomes permanent).
186
See DAVID COLE & J ULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE W AR
ON T ERROR 18–19 (2007).
187
See, e.g., Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988). For a discussion on Bruscino, see
supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
188
In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464,
470 (4th Cir. 1999).
189
Id.
190
Id. at 370–72.
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minimal due process in response to a threat of riot, 191 although, as Justice
Stevens wrote in dissent, the emergency justification for such segregation
only lasted a few days.192 Nonetheless, the inmate’s segregation continued
even after the temporary emergency had ended. 193 The distinction between
emergency and normalcy had broken down; the supermax thus represented
emergency normalized.
Similarly, the rise of mass incarceration has been accompanied by a
crisis mentality—illustrated by the terminology “war on drugs” or “war on
crime”—initiated by President Lyndon Johnson over fifty years ago.194 A
carceral instinct became a permanent feature of the crisis mentality
characterized by these never-ending “wars.” As Professor David Garland
notes, the criminal justice system has been in a “perpetual sense of crisis,”
adding, however, that the term “crisis” seems “inappropriate for a situation
that has now endured for several decades.” 195 Moreover, that the high rates
of incarceration, particularly of African Americans and Hispanics, have
continued irrespective of actual crime rates suggests a mentality of perpetual
crisis and emergency regardless of the existence of an imminent threat to
society.196 Thus, the preventive model, premised on an ongoing sense of
permanent emergency requiring the incapacitation of dangerous people who
were usually nonwhites, underlay both the rise of mass incarceration and
prolonged, mass solitary confinement.
IV. ENDING PROLONGED SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
By the 1980s, courts had affirmed and legitimated prolonged solitary
confinement under the theory that prison officials, charged with preventing
violence and preserving order in prisons, had no alternative to the permanent
or very extended mass lock-up of dangerous and violent prisoners. 197 That
rationale has three fundamental flaws, and understanding those flaws is
essential to today’s movement for the reform and elimination of prolonged
191

459 U.S. 460, 472–76 (1983).
Id. at 489 n.16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193
Id.
194
Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/ [https://perma.cc/FY7Y-XPJN] (noting that fifty years
ago, President Johnson called for a “War on Crime”).
195
DAVID G ARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN C ONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 19 (2001).
196
Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579, 1592–93
(2019) (“[T]here was a sustained drop in crime during the same period where there was a massive increase
in the number of inmates—most of the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s . . . .”).
197
See supra notes 47–55 (discussing the high-profile judicial decisions of Bruscino and Wilkinson).
192
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solitary confinement. First, while judges such as Richard Posner understood
that solitary confinement causes mental harm, later developments in the
fields of psychology, neuroscience, and social science deepened the
scientific consensus that prolonged solitary presents a profound risk of
devastating mental and physical harm. 198 Second, the widely held view in the
1980s and ’90s that supermax prisons were locking up the worst of the
worst199 turns out to be false. Major prison systems such as California, Ohio,
and New York have recognized that most of the prisoners preventively
incarcerated in supermax or other prolonged solitary units did not require
such draconian isolation and instead could have been managed in general
population units.200 Finally, even for the relatively small number of truly
dangerous, violent prisoners, who require separation from the general prison
population, alternatives to the modern supermax have been proposed since
the 1980s and continue to be developed today. 201 Although viable alternatives
have been proposed at critical junctures in the process of the “supermaximumization” of American prisons, these have largely been ignored by
prison officials and legislatures.
A. Rejecting the Preventive Paradigm
The preventive paradigm—whether used in the context of the “war on
terror,” the “war on crime or drugs,” or the confinement of violent
prisoners—generally leads to overclassification of so-called dangerousness
198

See generally SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11 (containing chapters by social scientists,
psychologists, and neuroscientists demonstrating harm to physical health caused by loneliness or lack of
social interaction, mental harm and risk of social death, and potential harm to the brain caused by
prolonged solitary confinement).
199
See DeMaio, supra note 143, at 210 (explaining that the benefit of removing the “most dangerous
inmates” from the general prison population is the “general premise upon which supermax prisons are
based”); Kurki & Morris, supra note 29, at 391 (“The new ‘dangerous’ prisoner is described as more
violent, more disturbed, more disruptive, and, therefore, less likely to adjust to ordinary prison
conditions . . . . Prison administrators often describe supermax inmates as ‘the worst of the worst[,]’
people who have nothing to lose and therefore do not hesitate from ‘taking a swing at a corrections officer
or preying on another inmate.’” (citations omitted)); Maximilienne Bishop, Note, Supermax Prisons:
Increasing Security or Permitting Persecution?, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 461 (2005) (“Super-maximum
security (‘Supermax’) facilities are purported to house the most invidious and dangerous criminals in the
nation’s prisons who pose such a threat to prison security that they can only be controlled by isolation.”).
200
Settlement Agreement at 4, Peoples v. Fischer, No. 1:11-cv-02694-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2015),
available
at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-NY-0062-0011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KPZ-BCF8]; Settlement Agreement at 10, Ashker v. Brown, No. C 09-05796 CW
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015), available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/2015-0901-ashker-Settlement_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6SS-DA44]. See infra note 217 and
accompanying text on Ohio’s conversion of most of its supermax prison to a maximum-security prison
after the district court decision in Austin v. Wilkinson.
201
See infra Section I.B.
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without clear standards or due process to restrict the state in whom it
detains.202 That is exactly what happened in the prolonged solitary
confinement context. An alternative urged at the time of the Marion
lockdown was to discard the preventive model and return to a system that
addresses crisis and misconduct through temporary lockdowns. This system
would discipline, for a determinate period, only those prisoners who had
engaged in serious misconduct, as opposed to preventively locking down the
entire prison permanently.203
California and Ohio are examples of the enormous overclassification of
supposedly dangerous prisoners. California, as already mentioned, placed
thousands of alleged gang members or associates in supermax SHU prisons
with no way out. In the context of a lawsuit brought by a class of prisoners
held in Pelican Bay SHU, James Austin, a corrections classification expert,
submitted a report finding that California’s use of a status-based system
relying on gang affiliation for placement and retention in the SHU results in
a system whereby individuals who actually present no major management
problem are retained in SHU for “excessive periods of time.” 204 Austin’s
conclusions were shared by Emmitt Sparkman, a longtime correctional
official who had overseen the reforms of Mississippi’s solitary confinement
unit.205 Austin also discovered that the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) never examined whether or not SHU placement
of gang-affiliated inmates reduces violence throughout its prison system. 206
202
See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 186, for the general problems attendant to the preventive
paradigm.
203
See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 107 (congressional testimony of Jan Susler) (citing
cases and wardens challenging long-term lockdowns); WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 47 (testimony
of David Ward) (arguing that lockdown should not be permanent).
204
Expert Report of Dr. James Austin at 2, 7–8, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 2015), available at https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Redacted_
Austin%20Expert%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSW9-QSBH]. Austin studied the records of the
named plaintiffs and found that they had “an exceptionally low rate of disciplinary infractions for a tenyear period for a high security population.” Id. at 15. The vast majority of those violations were minor,
such as unauthorized talking. For Austin, “[a] system that places such inmates in SHU for over a decade
defies all logic.” Id. He concluded that “[t]he inmate classification and disciplinary conduct data all
suggest that these inmates, in general, do not require SHU placement.” Id. at 19. Indeed, Austin’s review
of forty-one plaintiff class members found that over 70% were assessed by the CDCR as “low risk,” a
designation seemingly in contradiction to their continued placement in the SHU. Id. at 20.
205
Expert Report of Emmit L. Sparkman at 3, 17–19, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-00540023.pdf [https://perma.cc/S72L-V5LP] (“There is no penological justification for long term special
housing of offenders for investigation, protective custody, non-violent rule violations, length and/or type
of prison sentence. . . . [T]he CDCR places and retains more offenders [than other prison systems] without
safety and security justification for longer periods of time with harsher conditions.”).
206
See Expert Report of Dr. James Austin, supra note 204, at 11.
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When Austin conducted that review himself, he found that the increased use
of SHU had not produced lower assault rates in CDCR prisons, but rather,
the rate of assault increased. 207
After more than twenty-five years, CDCR finally admitted that its SHU
policy of preventively keeping prisoners associated with gangs in prolonged
solitary confinement “was a mistake”208 and settled the Ashker v. Brown
lawsuit, agreeing to no longer place prisoners in indeterminate solitary
confinement based on gang status but only for proven serious misconduct
after a due process hearing resulting in a determinate SHU sentence. 209 While
the determinate SHU sentences prisoners can receive are still extensive, 210
and CDCR continues to send many individuals to the SHU based on
unreliable or fabricated confidential information, 211 California is placing far
fewer prisoners in solitary confinement and has converted a wing of the
infamous Pelican Bay SHU into a minimum security general population
unit.212
Similarly, Ohio’s practices illustrate the use of the supermax to house
hundreds of prisoners who do not require such high security. Ohio built its
supermax in Youngstown in response to the 1993 Lucasville Prison Riot and
started placing prisoners there in 1998. 213 The Lucasville riot was
undoubtedly brought on by overcrowding, faulty prison management, and a
failure to respond to legitimate prisoner grievances and peaceful protests,
207

Id. at 20.
Oprah Winfrey, Reforming Solitary Confinement at an Infamous California Prison, 60 MINUTES
(July 22, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-reforming-solitary-confinement-at-aninfamous-california-prison/ [https://perma.cc/VA36-5UT2] [hereinafter 60 MINUTES] (Scott Kernan,
Secretary of CDCR, states that the policy of sending gang members to SHU indefinitely “was a
mistake . . . . It didn’t work because of the impact on the offenders.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Expert
Report of Dr. James Austin, supra note 204, at 13 & n.18 (noting that the CDCR has explicitly
acknowledged that its policy “overclassified” prisoners for SHU placement).
209
Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, supra note 200, at 7–8.
210
A gang member who commits murder in prison related to gang activities can still theoretically
receive a five-year SHU sentence with two additional years in a step-down program, although in practice
the sentences have been considerably shorter. See id. at 12.
211
Ashker v. Newsom, No. 09-cv-05796-CW, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13382, at *51 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
25, 2019) (finding that California’s use of confidential information to place people in the SHU
systemically violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
212
Between December 2012 and August 2016, California’s entire solitary confinement population
dropped from 9,870 to 3,471. California Solitary Confinement Statistics: Year One After Landmark
Settlement, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://ccrjustice.org/california-solitary-confinementstatistics-year-one-after-landmark-settlement [https://perma.cc/Q3LU-F4YH]; see also 60 MINUTES,
supra note 208 (Scott Kernan discussing converting a wing of the Pelican Bay SHU into a minimumsecurity unit).
213
Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722–23 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also LYND, supra note
56, at 11.
208
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including a class action lawsuit challenging the overcrowding and doublecelling which was eventually dismissed by the United States Supreme
Court.214
In 2001, a prisoner class action lawsuit challenged conditions at Ohio’s
Supermax Prison (OSP) and the State’s procedures for placement and
retention there. Judge James Gwin found that
[o]pened in 1998, the OSP is an ill-conceived legislative remedy to a problem
that did not exist. Reacting to the horrendous April 1993 riot at the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility at Lucasville, the General Assembly poured huge
amounts of state funds into OSP, Ohio’s first supermax prison. The fault of this
plan lies in the fact that the Lucasville riot was caused by overcrowding in the
maximum security area, not by any lack of space in the high maximum security.
Despite a need for maximum security cells, the Ohio General Assembly built
OSP to provide high-maximum security cells, cells for which there was little
need.215

The district court in Austin found that the procedures for placement and
retention at OSP violated due process and that numerous prisoners had been
placed and retained there inappropriately.216 It ordered new hearings, which
resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of prisoners housed in the
supermax and led Ohio to convert most of the supermax into a maximum
(not super-maximum) security facility.217
Ohio and California’s supermax experiences illustrate that mass
solitary, as with mass incarceration, incapacitated and isolated numerous

214
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); LYND, supra note 56, at 12–30 (describing the
conditions and the peaceful protests by prisoners attempting to change the situation). In Rhodes, prisoners
contended that the close confinement of double-celling for long periods creates a dangerous potential for
frustration, tension, and violence, which could lead to rioting, a concern rejected by the Court’s majority
as a basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 349 n.14. More than ten years later, the prisoners did
riot, and a report by a commission of prison officials led by Gary Mohr reported that “double celling of
the inmate population was voiced by a vast majority of both staff and inmates as a cause of the
disturbance.” LYND, supra note 56, at 23.
215
Order, Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-71 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2005), ECF No. 624; see also
Austin, 189 F. Supp. at 723 (noting that evidence suggested that Ohio did not need a supermax prison).
216
Austin, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
217
Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F. Supp. 2d 660, 674–75 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Brief for Respondents at
17–18 & n.5, Wilkinson v. Austin, No. 04-495, 2005 WL 556835 (Mar. 4, 2005). Ohio’s statistics
demonstrate that by the end of 2004 when the district court’s procedures had been fully implemented, the
population of the supermax declined from over 400 prisoners at the outset of the lawsuit to 55 prisoners
remaining in Level V, or super-maximum classification. E-mail from Alice Lynd to Jules Lobel (Aug. 9,
2019, 7:00 PM) (on file with journal).
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people who did not warrant such isolation. 218 As with mass incarceration,
there is a tremendous reform movement even amongst prison officials who
recognize that mass solitary has resulted in the isolation, incapacitation,
incarceration, and essentially the discarding of thousands of people whose
misconduct does not warrant such treatment. 219 Society and the courts are
rediscovering the lesson, apparent in the 1800s, that solitary confinement
wreaks profound damage to a person’s psychological state,220 and modern
neuroscience and social science have now recognized that isolation leads to
tremendous damage to the brain and body as well. 221 Moreover, as a recent
National Academy of the Sciences landmark study on mass incarceration
concluded, the use of supermax and other extreme forms of isolation in
America’s prisons has “done little or nothing to reduce system-wide prison

218
See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 19 (arguing that mass incarceration has led to the incarceration
of hundreds of thousands of minorities who did not warrant incarceration); Alexander, supra note 33
(same).
219
See, e.g., TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 13, at iii; Gottschalk, supra note 14, at 261–63 (highlighting
the support for reform of solitary confinement by corrections officials); Timothy Williams, Prison
Officials Join Movement to Curb Solitary Confinement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/us/prison-directors-group-calls-for-limiting-solitaryconfinement.html [https://perma.cc/WP5J-M5YE]; see generally Amy Fettig & David C. Fathi,
“Loneliness Is a Destroyer of Humanity”, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 343 (describing
the current reform movement against prolonged solitary confinement); Alexander A. Reinert, Solitary
Troubles, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 927 (2018) (discussing current reform movement).
220
See, e.g., Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting the psychiatric risks of
solitary confinement); Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 566–69 (3d Cir. 2017)
(accepting the “scientific consensus” that solitary confinement “‘is psychologically painful, can be
traumatic and harmful, and puts many of those who have been subjected to it at risk of long-term . . .
damage’” (quoting Haney & Lynch, supra note 27, at 500)), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Farnan,
138 S. Ct. 357 (2017); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 132 (2003) (summarizing the numerous psychological studies
that demonstrate the damage to the individual wrought by solitary confinement, stating that “there is not
a single published study of solitary or supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement
lasted for longer than 10 days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at will, that
failed to result in negative psychological effects”).
221
See, e.g., Louise Hawkley, Social Isolation, Loneliness, and Health, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT,
supra note 11, at 185 (summarizing social science evidence that isolation harms the physical health of
the individual); Jules Lobel & Huda Akil, Law & Neuroscience: The Case of Solitary Confinement,
147 DAEDALUS 61 (2018) (summarizing neuroscientific evidence that solitary confinement damages the
brain).
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disorder or disciplinary infractions.”222 As a result, courts have begun to
impose significant restrictions on the use of solitary confinement. 223
B. Alternatives to Solitary Confinement for Violent Prisoners
As with mass incarceration, recent judicial decisions and reform efforts
still have not adequately addressed the problem of the very violent individual
who most prison officials would say requires prolonged solitary confinement
to manage. What Danielle Sered and others have pointed out in the mass
incarceration context is relevant to the solitary confinement reform
movement: “The current reform narrative, though compelling, has been
based on a fallacy; that the United States can achieve large-scale
transformative change . . . by changing responses to nonviolent offenses.” 224
Both mass incarceration and mass solitary have arisen based on a false and
racist narrative of the violent individual:
At the heart of that narrative is the story of an imagined monstrous other—a
monster who is not quite human like the rest of us, who is capable of
extraordinary harm and incapable of empathy, who inflicts great pain but does
not feel it as we do, a monster we and our children have to be protected from at
any price.225

The image of this alleged monster perpetuated the rise of mass solitary
confinement as much as, if not more, than mass incarceration itself. 226 Yet,
222
COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF H IGH RATES OF I NCARCERATION, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 186 (Jeremy Travis,
Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014); see also Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER (Mar. 23,
2009), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole [https://perma.cc/2GHK-TTVX]
(citing 2003 study finding that after supermax prisons were opened in Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota,
“levels of inmate-on-inmate violence were unchanged”).
223
See Porter, 923 F.3d at 368; Williams, 848 F.3d at 572–74; Settlement Agreement, Ashker v.
Brown, supra note 200, at 4–16; see generally Fettig & Fathi, supra note 219 (describing the current
reform movement against prolonged solitary confinement).
224
SERED, supra note 33, at 5–6; see also Alexander, supra note 33 (“Despite the abysmal failure of
‘get tough’ strategies to break cycles of violence in cities like Chicago, reformers of our criminal justice
system in recent years have largely avoided the subject of violence, instead focusing their energy and
resources on overhauling our nation’s drug laws and reducing penalties for nonviolent offenses.”).
225
SERED, supra note 33, at 11.
226
Justin Peters, How a 1983 Murder Created America’s Terrible Supermax-Prison Culture, SLATE
(Oct. 23, 2013, 3:56 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/10/marion-prison-lockdown-thomassilverstein-how-a-1983-murder-created-america-s-terrible-supermax-prison-culture.html
[https://perma.cc/BN3Q-8XD7]. In 1998, former Federal Bureau of Prisons Director Norman Carlson
justified his decision to lock down Marion as a harsh but necessary and effective measure, telling the San
Francisco Chronicle that “[t]here is no way to control a very small subset of the inmate population who
show absolutely no concern for human life . . . . [Silverstein] . . . had multiple life sentences. Another life
sentence is no deterrent.” Id. (emphasis added); see generally JAMES KILGORE, UNDERSTANDING MASS
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prolonged solitary confinement’s extremely deleterious effects on an
individual and its affront to human dignity constitutes torture as well as cruel
and degrading treatment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and
international law. 227 As torture, it should be prohibited generally, and not
simply against those who are nonviolent or not violent enough to supposedly
warrant such treatment. We will never end prolonged solitary confinement,
nor recognize its true nature as torture of the body and soul, unless we
develop alternative, humane ways of treating those few whose persistent
violence does require some restrictions and separation from the general
prison population.
The 1983 Marion permanent lockdown prompted suggestions of
alternatives to draconian isolation that were ignored and long forgotten. In
1985, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice, concerned about the conditions of solitary
confinement at Marion, held oversight hearings into the lockdown at
Marion.228 The subcommittee commissioned two consultants with substantial
expertise and experience in the field of corrections, David Ward and Allen
Breed, to investigate the situation at Marion and make recommendations
about what to do moving forward.
Ward and Breed’s “most important recommendation” was that the
lockdown not be accepted as a permanent institution. 229 As a long-term
alternative for managing the highest security prisoners in the system, they
urged the “[c]onstruction of a ‘new generation’ level 6 prison along the lines
of the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights.”230 In their
opinion, such a prison would combine the high-tech surveillance features of
a modern supermax with small units that would have “40–50 inmates, all in
individual cells, contain[] dining and laundry areas, counselling offices,
INCARCERATION: A PEOPLE’S GUIDE TO THE KEY CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE OF OUR TIME 35–36 (2015);
Shawn E. Fields, Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 944–47 (2019) (tracing the effects of
criminal justice policies on the proliferation of the “black criminal underclass trope”); Joshua Kleinfeld,
Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 1008–15 (2016) (considering a philosophical
approach relating perceptions of evil characteristics to ideologies on punishment); Jonathan Simon, Is
Mass Incarceration History?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1089–94 (2017) (providing a historiographical
perspective addressing strategies targeting perceived racial threats in the rise of mass incarceration).
227
See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM
RULES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS ( THE NELSON MANDELA RULES) 13–14 (2015)
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3GQ-54DE] (prohibiting indefinite and prolonged solitary confinement and defining
prolonged solitary confinement as being more than fifteen days in solitary).
228
See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16.
229
WARD & BREED, supra note 74, at 47.
230
Id. at 27.
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indoor game rooms, a wire enclosed outdoor recreation yard and a work
area.”231 The relatively small, self-contained units would “allow congregate
activities on a unit basis.”232 In sum, while a prison in the Oak Park Heights
model could be considered a supermax, it would not have the distinguishing
features of a modern supermax: extreme social isolation, lack of
environmental stimulation, and absence of physical contact.
A study conducted by Professor Roy King of the prison conditions at
Oak Park Heights confirmed the consultants’ observations. Prisoners were
permitted to eat in small groups at tables if they wanted, received up to
sixteen hours per month of contact visits, engaged in small group recreation
and work opportunities, and had access to fifteen- or thirty-minute phone
calls, which about 30% of the prisoners used daily. 233 Had the Oak Park
Heights model been followed by the federal government and other states, it
might have changed the course of the supermax boom that followed. 234
Oak Park Heights, at least initially, was very secure and safe by modern
prison standards. Remarkably, after ten years of operation, the prison had
experienced no escape attempts or serious acts of violence, despite housing
very dangerous prisoners serving life without parole, including about
twenty-five to thirty prisoners who had been transferred from Marion. 235 One
former warden of Oak Park Heights attributes its success to tight security
combined with a positive attitude towards prisoners, which allowed highrisk prisoners out of their cells for most of the day, provided significant
programming, and attempted to create a positive environment, unlike the
traditional supermax.236 Former Warden Bruton wrote in 2004 that after
231

Id. at 28.
Id.
233
Roy D. King, Maximum-Security Custody in Britain and the USA: A Study of Gartree and Oak
Park Heights, 31 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 126, 146–47 (1991); cf. JAMES H. BRUTON, THE BIG HOUSE:
LIFE I NSIDE A SUPERMAX SECURITY PRISON 41 (2004) (stating that more than 50% of the prisoners
housed at Oak Park Heights had killed someone, 95% are violent offenders, and a “significant number
are serving life without parole”).
234
See King, supra note 5, at 172–73 (contrasting Oak Park Heights with supermaxes and noting
that substantial programming at the former and the absence of such programming in the supermaxes was
neither “a necessary [n]or desirable feature”).
235
BRUTON, supra note 233, at 150. Like Marion, Oak Park Heights was built in response to violence
and disturbances that wracked the state’s maximum-security prison (Minnesota Correctional Facility at
Stillwater). Id. at 27–28.
236
Id. at 31–41; see also King, supra note 233, at 147–48 (stating that it is well known that the
success of Oak Park Heights is “in large part due to the management philosophy of its exceptional
Warden” who embraces a philosophy whereby staff “should treat inmates as we would want our sons,
brothers or fathers treated”); see also CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, BECOMING A MODEL WARDEN: STRIVING
FOR EXCELLENCE (2004) (describing the life and philosophy of Frank Wood, the first warden at Oak Park
Heights).
232
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twenty years of operation there had not been a homicide or escape, nor were
drugs or homemade weapons rife at Oak Park Heights. 237
Of course, the prison was never problem free, and conditions may have
become far worse since its first decade of existence. Today, it has a draconian
disciplinary segregation unit holding fifty-two prisoners in what can for
some be very prolonged solitary. Offenders who do not follow the rules are
sometimes threatened with transfer to isolation in the federal system, and
physical contact with visitors has been severely limited. 238 Moreover, there
has recently been a spike in violence at the prison, with instances of assault
on staff and prisoners rising. 239 Yet, Oak Park Heights’s practices, at least in
its beginnings, of confining dangerous prisoners in high security, but not
isolating, conditions serves as a potential alternative to the prolonged solitary
confinement of modern supermax confinement.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons rejected Ward and Breed’s suggestion.
Initially, the BOP decided it did not need a new supermax prison, noting that
the number of prisoners needing such high security was not increasing. The
BOP concluded it would be a more efficient use of limited resources to
construct “additional medium security facilities” to “reduce the overall level
of crowding” than to put resources into a supermax for a “small number of
inmates.”240 Nonetheless, within a few years, the BOP reversed course, and
decided that it did, after all, need a supermax.241 But instead of revisiting the
model that Ward and Breed suggested242—a high security, tightly controlled
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BRUTON, supra note 233, at 38–39.
Id. at 52, 86–87, 103.
239
Bob Shaw, Violence Spikes at Oak Park Heights Prison, and the Search for Causes Is Urgent,
TWIN C ITIES PIONEER PRESS (Apr. 18, 2018, 7:26 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/04/18/asviolence-spikes-at-oak-park-heights-prison-the-search-for-solutions-grows-urgent/
[https://perma.cc/5RFW-JGLG].
240
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 150–51 (Letter from BOP Director Norman Carlson to
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier (Jan. 7, 1985)).
241
See FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 5. As Professor Reiter has
shown in other contexts, the decision to build ADX was not made the subject of public or even legislative
discussion, but was shielded from public view. REITER, 23/7, supra note 14. For example, a 1990 FOIA
request for information on the pending plans to construct the ADX was denied on the grounds that no
such plans existed. FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 13 n.7 (citing Letter
from Wallace H. Cheney, Gen. Counsel for the Fed. Bureau of Prisons, to Jan Susler, Att’y for the
People’s Law Office (Dec. 31, 1990)).
242
Indeed, the then-Director of the BOP testified before Congress in 1989 that the BOP was planning
to build a new high-security unit that would function similarly to Oak Park Heights:
238

[W]e are designing right now and hope to build with funds in 1990 a state-of-the-art facility for
[L]evel 6 prisoners in the Bureau of Prisons that would replace Marion, that would allow us to
permit prisoners more freedom during the day within a unit similar to a facility that was operated
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prison, which nonetheless allowed for group recreation in small units,
congregate meals, work opportunities, phone calls, and contact visits with
family and friends—the BOP constructed a new, more draconian version of
the Marion lockdown model, the ADX Supermax at Florence. 243
As public opinion, judicial decisions, and prison administrators have
reevaluated the use of prolonged solitary confinement in American prisons,
there has been increased interest in a model of segregating dangerous
prisoners without isolation, such as the one that Oak Park Heights initially
presented. Former Colorado Department of Corrections Director Rick
Raemisch has led the way in imagining and implementing alternative
approaches, even for the very violent prisoner, as has Director Leann Bertsch
in North Dakota.244 Raemisch eliminated mass prolonged solitary
confinement in Colorado and set up alternative units relying on small-group,
congregate activities to house dangerous prisoners. 245 Some European
nations have also developed alternatives that segregate high-risk prisoners
without the harsh social isolation found in American supermax prisons. In
Scotland, England, and Wales, for example, dangerous prisoners are
confined away from the general population, but in small groups rather than
total isolation. 246 There they are provided direct-contact family and legal
visits and telephone calls, as well as “access to education, gym facilities,
payment for work, association with other prisoners, and in-cell activities.” 247
Perhaps even more striking is the prison at Grendon in England, which
houses some of the most “damaged, disturbed and dangerous” prisoners in
the English prison system. 248 Despite its difficult population, Grendon
provides small-group therapy and daily community meetings and has
produced, in the words of its governor, “extraordinary outcomes.”249
a few years ago in Oak Park Heights in Minnesota that provides security and yet at the same time
allows a greater access to programs.
Oversight Hearings on Corrections: Overcrowding and Alternatives to Incarceration Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 34 (1989).
243
See FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO FLORENCE, supra note 60, at 11–13.
244
See Bertsch, supra note 42, at 325; Raemisch, supra note 42, at 311–13.
245
The author visited these units in August 2018.
246
See Expert Report of Dr. Andrew Coyle ¶¶ 37, 44, Exhibit 2, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv05796-CW
(N.D.
Cal.
Mar.
12,
2015),
available
at
http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/Coyle%20Expert%20Report.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P7WJ-DRVG].
247
Id. ¶ 37.
248
Jamie Bennett, Resisting Supermax: Rediscovering a Humane Approach to the Management of
High-Risk Prisoners, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 11, at 279, 287.
249
Id. at 289.
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Integral to the separation-without-isolation model is a humane approach
to prison management. As numerous prison experts pointed out at the time
and continue to urge, the violence and disturbances at Marion and other
prisons in the 1970s and ’80s were undoubtedly at least in part brought on
by inhumane, hostile prison management which did not recognize or
adequately respond to legitimate grievances. 250 The ACLU and other prison
experts testified before the Congressional Committee and before the courts
that the practices of the prison officials both before and during the lockdown
should be evaluated to determine whether “the errors or weaknesses in the
prison administration . . . created a climate for the occurrence of violence or
which exacerbated the violent confrontation.” 251 As numerous correctional
officials have recognized, treating prisoners humanely and responding to
legitimate grievances are key mechanisms in tamping down violence in
prisons.252 The court in Bruscino nevertheless categorically rejected any
notion that changing prison administration practices would at least help
reduce the violence at Marion and other prisons.253 And neither the BOP nor
Congress ever undertook any investigation into whether prison management
practices either led to or failed to prevent the violence that occurred at
Marion in 1983.
Once we remove the thousands of nonviolent or mentally ill prisoners
from supermaxes and other prolonged solitary units, it will be possible to
develop more positive, intensive programs incorporating social interaction
to house those who truly do require some separation from the general prison
250
See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 1–50 (describing the peaceful attempts of the Attica
prisoners to get redress for their grievances); N.Y. STATE SPECIAL COMM’ N ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 106–08 (1972) (same).
251
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 60–61 (statement of ACLU National Prison Project) (calling
for an investigation of the prison administration practices that may have helped cause the violence). As
the ACLU statement noted, there was a significantly higher rate of violence and homicides in the federal
prison system than in comparable state systems, even though the federal system has a higher budget,
newer facilities, and no more violent prisoners or gang violence than in comparable state systems. Id. at
63 n.11; see also id. at 67–68 (declaration of Vincent Nathan) (statement from well-respected expert in
corrections who submitted report to the committee stating that “the level of violence at a facility can be
significantly decreased when the complaints of prisons are dealt with fairly”); id. at 109, 125, 130 (report
from Marion Prisoners’ Rights Project citing testimony of Craig Haney, Bernard Rubin, and Dr. Arnold
Abrams that management of control unit, which dehumanizes prisoners, breeds anger and violence).
252
See Expert Report of Dr. Andrew Coyle, supra note 246, at 16, 21 (noting that the most effective
means of prison management require positive security in which staff relate to prisoners).
253
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[P]laintiffs argue that it is the conditions
at Marion before the lockdown that brutalized the inmates and caused them to become so violent and
destructive. This is rank conjecture and implausible to boot. Few inmates are assigned to Marion who do
not have a substantial history of violence in prison; it is not likely that these wolves would have turned
into sheep if Marion had been a gentler place.”). The history of Oak Park Heights, holding dangerous
prisoners who also had a history of violence, would contradict the Bruscino court.
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population. And authorities should rediscover the Oak Park Heights model
as constructed by “model warden” Frank Wood in the 1980s as an alternative
to the modern supermax, even for very dangerous prisoners. 254 As
congressional consultant David Ward put it, “The challenge for the Bureau
of Prisons, as we tried to emphasize in our report, is to try to do something
positive even with those problematic individuals under these very special
circumstances.”255 At the heart of ending both mass incarceration and
prolonged solitary confinement lies the quest to treating even very violent
people in a “positive,” humane way. This will preserve their human dignity
and reflect the rehabilitative goals of punishment which are inherent in the
value that even those who have committed terrible acts are capable of
redemption and change. 256
The conditions at modern supermaxes reflect a mission not of
protecting against violence, but of exercising absolute control over prisoners,
a goal that is facilitated by debilitating prisoners’ psychological states. The
first step towards an alternative to the mass use of solitary is to separate
punitive control from legitimate security functions. From a security
perspective, it is difficult to perceive any benefit to providing small, enclosed
recreation areas without equipment, windowless cells, and no phone calls
with family and friends, as was the case at Pelican Bay SHU. 257 The absolute
deprivation of reading materials, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Beard v.
Banks as “logical,”258 serves no serious security goal, nor does the
widespread censorship of books and materials, 259 nor the prohibition of
media interviews. In contrast, “positive” security, which involves the kind of
engaged staff–prisoner interactions banished from the supermax, can be
combined with small-group social interaction to provide human contact,
even for very dangerous prisoners.260
Perhaps most fundamentally, a recognition that the rise of the supermax
was undergirded by a perceived need to exercise total control over prisoners
deemed disruptive requires that reforms accord even allegedly dangerous
254
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security concerns.”).
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548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006).
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See RACHAEL KAMEL & BONNIE KERNESS, THE PRISON INSIDE THE PRISON: C ONTROL UNITS ,
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prisoners with some ability to dialogue with officials over the conditions
under which they live and challenge unjust policies. In the California
litigation that ended indeterminate solitary confinement in that state, the
most difficult aspect of the settlement was not resolving disputes over the
substantive policies that the State would henceforth implement, but rather
plaintiffs’ insistence that CDCR officials should meet with their
representatives on a quarterly basis to discuss the implementation of the
settlement decree. Those officials were willing to meet with plaintiffs’
lawyers but not with the plaintiffs themselves, perhaps believing that to do
so would accord prisoner representatives legitimacy and undermine
officials’ total control. Eventually it required mediation by the federal judge
overseeing the process to get CDCR to accept a compromise of semiannual
meetings between CDCR officials and prisoner representatives. 261 When
those meetings occurred after the Agreement was implemented, CDCR
officials often refused to even engage in a dialogue with the prisoner
representatives.262 Yet the challenge of according individuals confined in
high-security units some collective control over their circumstances and the
conditions of their confinement is critical to restoring human dignity and
hope to those who suffered through years of solitary confinement.
CONCLUSION
The current reform movement to end prolonged solitary confinement
has two major tasks. The first is to demonstrate the risk of harm the draconian
practice imposes on those prisoners subjected to it. In the last decade, our
understanding of the harm wrought by solitary confinement has been
deepened by the work of social scientists who have shown that loneliness
and social isolation are as great a risk factor for a number of serious physical
conditions, such as hypertension, heart attacks, and strokes, as smoking or
obesity. 263 The work of neuroscientists has also established that solitary
confinement harms the human brain.
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See Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Brown, supra note 200, ¶ 49 (“Defendants shall meet with
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the four inmate representatives semiannually to discuss progress with
implementation of this Agreement.”).
262
Letter from Jules Lobel to Judge Vadas (Dec. 2, 2016) (on file with journal).
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See Expert Report of Louise C. Hawkley at 4–8, Ashker v. Brown, No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (Mar.
12, 2015) (discussing health effects of social isolation); Hawkley, supra note 221, at 185–98
(summarizing social science evidence that isolation harms the physical health of the individual); Julianne
Holt-Lunstad, Timothy B. Smith & J. Bradley Layton, Social Relationships and Mortality Risk: A MetaAnalytic
Review,
7
PLOS
MED.,
no.
7,
2010,
at
14–15,
available
at
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1000316
[https://perma.cc/SKX4-6KXW] (finding correlation between social interaction and mortality that is
comparable to other health risks).
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The second task is to overcome the mythology of the violent predator,
for whom prison officials have no alternative but to confine in draconian
isolation from other inmates, staff, and even families and friends. This Essay
has focused on that task. It has demonstrated that mass solitary in this country
developed not in response to that violent predator, but rather as a means for
officials to achieve control of political activists and “troublemakers”
amongst prisoners. Moreover, most prisoners caught up in the solitary
dragnet could be safely managed in well-run general population units instead
of warehoused in modern supermaxes. Finally, there is an alternative to the
modern supermax for those few who cannot be safely managed in general
population: separation without isolation.
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